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I. Introduction 
"An era of advocacy has begun out of which, I am 
sure, public assistance is never going to be the same." 
* A.B. Cornell University, 1961, 
LL.B. Columbia University, School of 
Law, 1964. Director, BoaIt-Hastings 
Clinical Law Program. Lecturer in 
Law, University of California, BoaIt 
Hall. Instructor in Law, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law. Member, New York 
and California State Bars. 
CAL LAW 1970 
The author would like to note that 
he was counsel in several of the cases 
discussed in this article. 
The author wishes to acknowledge 
the invaluable assistance of Judith R. 
Gordon, student at Golden Gate Col-
lege, School of Law, in the preparation 
of this article. 
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John C. Montgomery [Former California State Wel-
fare Director, in his final press statement as Director, 
1969]. 
In California, over 1,500,000 people are dependent on 
public assistance for all or part of their means of subsistence. l 
To provide aid to these individuals, a large and complex 
bureaucracy has developed over the years that expends more 
than a billion dollars a year,2 and is governed by an ever-
growing set of federal, state, and local rules and regulations.s 
Notwithstanding the size of the bureaucracy and the com-
plexity of the laws governing the system, until recently there 
had been few instances of judicial review of welfare practices 
or laws. With a few exceptions,4 the court decisions relating 
to welfare prior to 1968 dealt with situations where conflicts 
between county and state welfare agencies were resolved,5 or 
where appeals were taken from convictions in welfare fraud 
prosecutions.6 It was unusual to have a recipient seek affirm-
1. U. S. Department of HEW, Social 
Security Administration, Social Secu-
rity Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 12, p. 69 
(December, 1969). 
2. State Department of Social Wel-
fare, Division of Research and Sta-
tistics, Draft Tables 1 & 50. Prepared 
for the 1968-1969 Annual Statistical 
Report, as yet unpublished. 
This amount reflects the total welfare 
expenditures that are paid from federal, 
state, and county funds. The federal 
government provides approximately 
50% of the cost; the state, approx-
imately 30%; and the counties, approx-
imately 20%. 
3. From the federal government 
comes 42 U.S.c. §§ 301 et seq. (The 
Social Security Act), the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare's 
Handbook ot Public Assistance Ad-
ministration, and regulations in the 
Code of Federal Regulations. Cali-
fornia has codified its public assistance 
laws in the Welfare and Institutions 
Code. Its regulations are compiled in 
560 
the State Department of Social Wel-
fares' Manual ot Policies and Proce-
dures. Other state manuals are the 
Fiscal Manual and the Research and 
Statistics Manual. Each county pro-
mulgates its own rules and regulations 
regarding its relief programs. 
4. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal.2d 
733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697 
(1967); Cox v. State Social Welfare 
Board, 193 Cal. App.2d 708, 14 Cal. 
Rptr. 776 (1961); Pearson v. State 
Social Welfare Bd., 54 Cal.2d 184, 5 
Cal. Rptr. 553, 353 P.2d 33 (1960). 
5. See, e.g., County of L. A. v De-
partment of Social Welfare, 41 Cal.2d 
455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953); County of 
Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Board, 
229 Cal. App.2d 762, 40 Cal Rptr. 605 
(1964). 
6. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 
2d 521, 11 Cal Rptr. 537, 360 P.2d 
33, 92 A.L.R.2d 413 (1961); People v. 
Owens, 231 Cal. App.2d 691, 42 Cal. 
Rptr. 153 (1965). 
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ative judicial redress on the grounds that welfare aid was 
illegally or unconstitutionally denied. Despite the substan-
tial efforts of a few scholars-most notably Dr. Jacobus ten 
Broek7-little serious discussion of the legal issues raised by 
the welfare system was undertaken. 
Not until the mid-sixties, with its emphasis on social reform 
and legal assistance to the poor, did the first substantial de-
bates on welfare issues begin to take shape in California and 
the rest of the country. 8 With the funding of federally sup-
ported neighborhood law offices, under the Economic Op-
portunity Act of 1964,9 litigation having potentially enormous 
impact on the administration of public assistance began in 
earnest. Practices and laws are now under challenge that in 
the past certainly would have been found illegal or unconstitu-
tional had legal representation been available. 10 In part, the 
result of years of isolation from judicial scrutiny is now causing 
some disruption in the smooth administration of the system. 
Yet, for those who value the rule of law and the duty of state 
administrators to abide by it, such judicial review is essential 
to a properly ordered administrative system. The shock of 
having been exposed to the bright light of judicial review has 
caused some consternation among those who advocate the 
insulation of government from the legal challenges of the 
poor.n 
Much of the welfare litigation in California in 1969 has 
been directed to the enforcement of existing law as well as 
7. See, e.g., Jacobus ten Broek, Cal-
ifornia's Dual System of Family Law: 
Its Origin, Development and Present 
Status. Part I, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257 
(1964); Part II, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 
900 (1964). See also Jacobus ten 
Broek and Floyd W. Matson: The 
Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 
Cal. L. Rev. 809 (1966). 
8. Symposium: Law of the Poor. 
54 Cal. L. Rev. 319 (1966). 
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et. seq. (1964). 
10. Before federal funding of legal 
assistance offices in 1964, the welfare 
CAL LAW 1970 
recipient's case was seldom presented 
to the courts. Welfare administrators 
were free to interpret statutes and rules 
almost at will. Loren Miller, Race, 
Poverty and the Law, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 
386, 396-97 (1966). 
11. Senator Murphy introduced an 
amendment to the Economic Opportu-
nity Act that was not passed but that 
was aimed at preventing legal services 
programs from suing government 
agencies. S.B. 3016; 91st Congress, 
2nd session. Introduced on October 
10, 1969. 
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to the challenge, on constitutional grounds, of welfare laws, 
regulations, and practices.12 Some of these court actions have 
resulted in increasing the cost of public assistance programs.13 
For the most part, however, these added costs have resulted 
from judicially ordered compliance with existing law; the 
implication is that for years welfare administrators have been, 
and still are, illegally depriving thousands of persons of welfare 
aid to which they are legally entitled. 
Before turning to a discussion of the significant court deci-
sions of 1969, a brief overview of the California welfare 
system is in order. 14 
II. Public Assistance in California 
Public assistance in California, as in most other states, IS 
administered through two basic types of programs: 
( 1) the "categorical assistance" programs established by 
the Social Security Act,15 (implemented by regulations 
adopted by the U.S. Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, supervised by the state, administered by the 
individual counties,16 and supported by county, state, 
and federal funds);l7 and 
(2) the general assistance program created by state law18 
12. See infra, for a detailed discus-
sion of these cases. 
13. The state estimated that one of 
the cases discussed infra, could cost 
about $9,000,000 in federal, state, and 
local funds. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, 
No. 193675, Sac. Sup. Ct. (Memoran-
dum Opinion filed October 1, 1969). 
14. A full description of the present 
welfare system is beyond the scope of 
this article. For those interested in 
the subject, see Wedemeyer & Moore, 
The American Welfare System, 54 Cal. 
L. Rev. 326 (1966); see also, Re-
port of the Senate Social Welfare Sub-
committee on General Research, A 
Study of Welfare Expenditures, Vol. 
21, No. 15 (1969). 
562 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. 
16. Cal Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 
10600, 10800. 
17. Total expenditures for cash 
grants for the year were $1,189,825,-
199; federal expenditures were $548,-
211,131; state expenditures, $453,053,-
415; and county expenditures, $188,-
560,653. State Department of Social 
Welfare, Division of Research and 
Statistics, Draft Table 1, prepared for 
the 1968-1969 Annual Statistical Re-
port, as yet unpublished. 
18. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 17000. 
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but supervised and administered by each county and 
supported solely by county funds. 19 
Most recipients receive financial aid under the "categorical 
assistance" programs.2ll Under the Social Security Act, cer-
tain categories of needy persons are entitled to receive feder-
ally supported public assistance. The elderly (those over 65) 
are eligible for Old Age Assistance l (known in California 
as Old Age Security); certain classes of needy children are 
eligible for aid and services to needy families with children2 
(known in California as AFDC;3 needy blind are entitled 
to aid to the blind;4 and permanently disabled persons are 
eligible for aid to the permanently and totally disabled6 
(known in California as A TD) . Thus, aside from other 
specific eligibility requirements discussed below, a person 
must be needy6 and must be either aged,7 blind,S a dependent 
child9 or the caretaker of a dependent child,l° or permanently 
and totally disabledll in order to receive assistance under the 
Social Security Act. 
Those persons who do not fit within one of the federally 
created categories are eligible only for general assistance, the 
19. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 
§ 17001. County of Los Angeles v. 
Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 
2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953). 
20. In California, in August 1969, 
73,900 recipients were receiving county 
general assistance, whereas approx-
imately 1,500,000 were counted on the 
categorical aid programs. U. S. Dept. 
of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Social Security Administration, Social 
Security Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 12, p. 
69 (Dec., 1969). 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306. 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644. 
3. AFDC is also provided to families 
where one of the parents is unem-
ployed. This program is referred to as 
the AFDC-U program. Welf. & Inst. 
Code § 11201. Because of federal 
eligibility conditions, a significant por-
CAL. LAW 1970 
tion of the AFDC program for the un-
employed in California is funded solely 
from state and county funds. 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206. Cali-
fornia has developed two types of aid 
programs for the blind. The first, Aid 
to the Blind, is contained in sections 
12500 et. seq. (Chapter 4) of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code. The second 
category, Aid to the Potentially Self-
Supporting Blind, is contained in sec-
tions 13000 et. seq. (Chapter 5) of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code. 
5. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1351-1355. 
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 1201, 
1351. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 302. 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1202. 
9. 42 U.S.c. § 602. 
10. 42 U.S.c. § 602. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1352. 
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welfare program funded entirely by local governments in 
California. 12 The basic requirements for general assistance 
are indigency and county residence.13 
The Social Security Act establishes various requirements 
for a state's categorical assistance programs that, if complied 
with, result in federal participation in the costs of assistance 
provided to California's eligible poor. A state must conform 
to federal requirements in order to receive federal participa-
tion.14 Failure to comply with federal requirements could 
result, in theory, in the loss of federal funds for the entire 
program. 15 Basic requirements common to each of the cate-
gorical assistance programs include: state-wide operation of 
the program,16 financial participation by the state,17 designa-
tion of a single state agency to administer the plan of public 
assistance,18 an opportunity for a hearing for individuals ag-
grieved by welfare department action,19 safeguards on the use 
12. The county general assistance 
program and the obligation placed on 
each of the counties to est a blish such 
programs is created by Section 17000 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code, 
which states: 
"Every county and every city and 
county shall relieve and support all 
incompetent, poor, indigent persons, 
and those incapacitated by age, disease, 
or accident, lawfully resident therein, 
when such persons are not supported 
and relieved by their relatives or 
friends, by their own means, or by state 
hospitals or other state or private in-
stitutions. " 
13. Requirements of indigency and 
lawful residency are contained in Welf. 
& Inst. Code § 17000. As a result of 
the decision in Montgomery v. Burns, 
394 U.S. 848, 23 L.Ed.2d 31, 89 S.C!. 
1623 (1969), a county may no longer 
impose durational residency require-
ments. 
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 302, 602, 1202, 
1352. 
15. The Secretary of Health, Edu-
564 
cation and Welfare may, after oppor-
tunity for hearing, discontinue federal 
payments to a state for its welfare 
programs. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604(a). 
In practice, such conformity hearings 
have been rarely held and in no in-
stance have funds been withheld from 
the state. See general Note, Federal 
Judicial Review of State Welfare Prac-
tices, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 84 (1967). 
16. 42 U.S.c. § 302(a)(1)-(OAS); 
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)-(AFDC); 42 
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)-(AB); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1352(a)(1)-(ATD). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(2)-(OAS); 42 
U.S.C. § 602(a)(2)-(AFDC); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1202(a)(2)-(AB); 42 U.S.C. § 1352 
(a)(2)-(ATD). 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(3)-(OAS); 
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)-(AFDC); 42 
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(3)-(AB); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1352(a)(3)-(ATD). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(4)-(OAS); 
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4)-(AFDC); 42 
U.S.c. § 1202(a)(4)-(AB); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1352(a)(4)-(ATD). 
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or disclosure of information concerning applicants or recip-
ients,20 and the furnishing of assistance promptly to all eligible 
individuals. l In addition, each public assistance title under 
the Social Security Act contains certain conformity require-
ments particular to the type of recipient it benefits.:! To the 
extent that any state statutes or regulations conflict with the 
Social Security Act or federal regulations promulgated there-
under, such statutes or regulations are invalid.s 
The requirements of the Social Security Act are supple-
mented by federal regulations issued by the Department of 
Health. Education and Welfare that are binding on each of 
the states in the administration of their public assistance 
programs.' 
The statutory authority for the categorical aid programs in 
California is found in the Welfare and Institutions Code.6 
Categorical assistance programs are administered by the in-
dividual county welfare departments subject to the rules, reg-
ulations, and overall supervision of the State Department of 
Social Welfare.6 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(7)--(OAS); 
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9)-(AFDC); 42 
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(9)--(AB); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1352(a)(9)--(ATD). 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(8)--(OAS); 
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)-(AFDC); 42 
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(11)-(AB); 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1353(a) (lO)-(ATD). 
2. Compare the following sections of 
42 U.S.C.: 302, 602, 1202, 1352. 
3. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 20 
L.Ed.2d 1118, 88 S.Ct. 2128 (1968). 
It is the policy of this state to conform 
to the requirements of federal law. 
See Pearson v. State Social Welfare 
Board, 54 Cal.2d 184,214, 5 Cal. Rptr. 
553, 571, 353 P.2d 33, 51, and Welf. 
and Inst. Code § 11003. 
4. Federal regulations are found in 
the HEW Handbook of Public Assist-
ance Administration and are now being 
recodified in 45 Code of Federal Regu-
lations. All new and proposed regula-
CAL LAW 1970 
tions are published initially in the Fed-
eral Register and then recodified in 45 
Code of Federal Regulations. 
5. Like the Social Security Act, the 
Welfare and Institutions Code is di-
vided into separate sections covering 
both the eligibility requirements and 
grant payments for each of the sepa-
rate aid categories. For example, the 
statutes governing the AFDC program 
are set out at Welfare & Institutions 
Code §§ 11,200-11,488. There are 
also a number of code sections gen-
erally applicable to the programs and 
the administration of public social 
services. Welf. & Inst. Code 
§§ 10,000-11,158. 
6. The regulations of the State Wel-
fare Department are found primarily 
in the Manual of Policies and Proce-
dures; among other regulations issued 
by the Department are the Fiscal Man-
ual, the Research and Statistics Manual, 
and the Operations Manual. 
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The federal act (with the exception of a recently enacted 
provision7 that is now the subject of litigation in California)8 
does not specify a standard or level of living to be used by 
the states in administering their assistance programs. Con-
sequently, each state is responsible (within the limits of state 
law and the Constitution) for defining the standard of living 
that is used to determine who "needy persons" are in relation 
to each of its federally aided assistance programs, as well as 
the amounts of assistance they are to receive.9 
Despite the large sums spent annually for public welfare 
in California, the monthly cash grants received by individual 
welfare recipients are insufficient to provide them with a min-
imum amount for subsistence. In the adult categories, which 
include all the categorial aid programs except AFDC, the 
maximum allowable grants vary between $188.50 to $193.50 
per month per recipient. 10 The average cash grant to the 
elderly is $107 per month, to the disabled $120, to the blind 
$149. 11 Even these sums exceed the amounts paid to needy 
children of this state under the AFDC program. 12 Under 
a system of inadequate need standards13 and maximum grant 
7. Section 402(a)(23) of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) 
reads as follows: . provide 
that by July 1, 1969, the amounts 
used by the State to determine the 
needs of individuals will have been 
adjusted to reflect fully changes in 
living costs since such amounts were 
established, and any maximums that 
the State imposes on the amount of aid 
paid to families will have been propor-
tionately adjusted.' ' 
8. Bryant v. Montgomery, No. 
51909 Civil [N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6, 
1969]. 
9. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 
318, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1126, 88 S. Ct. 
2128, 2134 (1968). 
10. Department of Social Welfare, 
Research and Statistics Division, Pub-
lic Assistance Caseloads and Expen-
ditures, Jan. 6, 1970. Figures given 
are for November, 1969. 
566 
11. The average grants are lower 
than the maximum set forth above, 
since many adult recipients have some 
limited source of outside income such 
as social security or veteran's benefits. 
12. The disparities in the grants paid 
to recipients in the various categories 
(particularly between AFDC and the 
adult aids) have been the subject of 
recent litigation in other states. See, 
e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F.Supp. 
1332, No. 3-3012-B Civil (N.D. Texas, 
July 31, 1969, appeal to S.Ct.) CCH 
Poverty Law Reporter § 10,055, p. 
11,074. 
13. The grant structure in the 
AFDC program is based on figures 
reflecting the cost of living in the pe-
riod 1949-1951. Assembly Office of 
Research and Staff of Assembly Com-
mittee on Social Welfare, California 
Welfare: A Legislative Program for 
Reform, p. 117 (February, 1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 
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ceilings,14 a woman with one child can receive no more than 
$148 a month from the state, a woman with five children can 
receive no more than $300 a month, and a woman with ten 
children can receive no more than $392 a month/5 with $6 
increases for additional children.16 General assistance grants 
(being supported solely out of county tax dollars) are even 
lower than AFDC grants and are, in some instances, prac-
tically nonexistent. 17 
III. A Review of the Cases 
Given the general framework of the welfare system in 
California, let us examine the cases that were decided in 1969. 
In reviewing these cases, it is instructive to consider the 
decisions in terms of their impact on the welfare system. The 
discussion will begin with those cases directed against restric-
tive eligibility requirements, followed by the cases that have 
challenged illegal limitations on the amount of welfare pay-
ments. Finally, there will be a discussion of those cases 
directed at insuring that the welfare system will be fairly 
administered with due regard to the statutory and constitu-
tional rights of recipients. 
14. Welf. & Inst. Code § lI450(a). 
The maximum payable grants were last 
increased by the legislature in 1957. 
State Department of Social Welfare, 
California Welfare Director's News-
letter, Vol. IV, No.6, p. 4 (November-
December, 1968). A small upward ad-
justment of $2 or $3 per family was 
made administratively in 1966 as a re-
sult of an increase in federal participa-
tion in the cost of the AFDC program. 
Such an adjustment is required under 
the governing statute. 
15. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450(a) 
(as adjusted). The quoted figures can 
be found in the state welfare depart-
ment's regulations, Public Social Service 
Manual (PSS) §§ 44-313. 
CAL LAW 1970 
16. The six dollar increment for ad-
ditional children should once and for 
all dispel the myth that it is profitable 
to have more children on welfare to 
obtain greater benefits. 
17. The general assistance grants 
paid by the various counties averaged 
approximately $46 a month in Califor-
nia. U.S. Department of HEW Social 
Security Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 12, p. 
69, December, 1969. Figures for Aug-
ust, 1969. Some counties paid con-
siderably less than that figure. Whether 
the counties have met their obligations 
to provide support for their indigents 
under Welf. & Inst. Code § 17000 is 
open to serious question. 
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A. Cases Challenging Restrictive Eligibility Require-
ments 
It is common knowledge among those familiar with the pub-
lic assistance system that many thousands of needy persons 
in California do not receive public assistance of any form. A 
number of eligible persons do not apply for welfare either 
because they are unaware of their right to public aid or be-
cause they voluntarily decide not to seek "charity" (a decision 
partly induced by the community's generally negative attitude 
toward persons on public assistance) .18 
One reason for the increase in the number of persons on 
welfare has been the activity of various groups, including com-
munity action agencies, welfare rights groups, and legal aid 
programs in informing a growing number of poor people 
of their entitlements under the public assistance programs.19 
The largest number of needy persons denied public as-
sistance was excluded because of a series of restrictive eligibil-
ity requirements unrelated to their need for aid. The most 
publicized of these requirements was the durational residency 
test that operated, until recently, to deny public assistance to 
many needy persons lawfully resident in California.20 
. Other examples of restrictive eligibility requirements are 
found in the AFDC program. At present, eligibility for 
AFDC under both federal and state law turns on a finding not 
only of need but also of "deprivation." Only needy children 
who are deprived of "parental support," that is, who live in 
families where one of the parents is deceased, continually ab-
sent from the home, physically or mentally incapacitated,l or 
unemployed,2 are eligible for assistance.3 Needy children 
18. Scott, Briar. Welfare From Be-
low: Recipients' Views of the Public 
Welfare System, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 370 
(1966) . 
19. In California, once a person is 
found eligible for assistance, he is en-
titled to aid as a matter of statutory 
right. Board of Social Welfare v. 
L. A. County, 27 Cal.2d 81, 85-86, 
162 P.2d 630, 633 (1945). Most 
568 
recipients do not believe they have 
such a right. 
20. See text, infra, for a discussion 
of the requirement and of the cases 
successfully invalidating it. 
1. 42 U.s.C. § 606(a)(1). 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 607. 
3. See Macias v. Finch, infra, for a 
discussion of the court challenge to this 
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whose parents are fully employed but earn less than the wel-
fare standard of need are nevertheless ineligible for assistance. 
Children between 16 and 18 are denied aid (even though 
needy and deprived of parental support) unless they are in 
school, in a training program, or disabled.4 Other needy 
children are denied aid if their mother refuses to sign a crimi-
nal complaint against their absent father, or otherwise fails 
to cooperate with law enforcement officers.5 
Restrictive e1igibility requirements are also found in the 
county administered general assistance programs. For ex-
ample, needy individuals otherwise eligible for general assist-
ance are denied aid in some counties on the ground that they 
are medically employab1e (even if, in fact, no employment is 
available to them).6 
Recent court decisions in California have invalidated sev-
eral of these restrictive e1igibility requirements. It is fair to 
say that insofar as the decisions have invalidated existing 
eligibility requirements, they have contributed to an expansion 
in the number of needy persons eligible for assistance and have 
resulted in increased welfare expenditures in California.7 
The most far-reaching decision affecting welfare eligibility 
in California was the United States Supreme Court's decision 
policy, commonly referred to in wel-
fare parlance as the "Don't Work" 
rule. 
4. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11253. 
5. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11477. 
6. Two cases are now pending in the 
California federal courts challenging 
this rule on the grounds that it creates 
a conclusive presumption in violation 
of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. It is also contend-
ed that the rule violates California Wel-
fare and Institutions Code Section 
17000. Brunner v. Terzian, U.S.D.C. 
No. 51813 (N.D. Cal., Temporary Re-
straining Order issued July 25, 1969, 
Sweigert, J.) enjoining policy in Ala-
meda County; and Robertson v. Born, 
CAL LAW 1970 
U.S.D.C. No. 51364 (N.D. Cal., Pre-
liminary Injunction issued on June 12, 
1969, Peckham, J.) establishing a hear-
ing procedure before aid could be 
terminated and finding as a matter of 
law that plaintiffs have established a 
prima facie case that the rule violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Welfare and Institutions Code. 
7. The former State Welfare Direc-
tor, John C. Montgomery, estimated 
that the federal court's elimination of 
the durational residency requirements 
had a fiscal impact of $30,000,000 in 
federal, state, and local funds. Cali-
fornia Welfare Director's Newsletter, 
Special Issue (Vol. V, No.6), p. 3. 
(November-December, 1969). 
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in the durational residency case of Shapiro v. Thompson,s 
which resulted in the affirmance of a three-judge federal court's 
decision to enjoin California's durational residency laws.9 Be-
fore the Court's decision, needy persons in California who 
were otherwise eligible for aid could not qualify for public 
assistance unless they had resided in California for a specified 
period of time. The time period ranged from 1 year in the 
AFDC program10 to 5 of the last 9 years in the OAS program.ll 
California's residency laws reflected a welfare eligibility 
requirement that has existed in one form or another from the 
time of the Elizabethan Poor Laws.12 Originally, the rationale 
for the requirement was that a community had no responsibil-
ity for "outsiders," and that a locality was only obligated to 
provide assistance for "its own." While that justification 
might have had some foundation in the past, in a mobile 
society such as the United States, the rationale becomes more 
difficult to accept, particularly where a large portion of the 
welfare costs are assumed by the federal government. 
A majority of the United States Supreme Court held that 
durational residency requirements were unconstitutional, since 
they denied the equal protection of the laws under the Four-
teenth Amendment to residents of less than a year and inter-
fered with an individual's fundamental right to traveP3 The 
Court found that the effect of the waiting requirement was 
to create two classes of resident families who were equally in 
need of public assistance, but whose situation differed solely 
on the basis of the fact that one group had resided in the state 
for less than one year. On this basis, aid was granted to one 
class while the second class was denied aid "upon which may 
8. 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 89 
S.Ct. 1322 (1969). 
9. Burns v. Montgomery, 299 F. 
Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1968) aff'd sub 
/lorn; Montgomery v. Burns, 394 U.S. 
848, 23 L.Ed.2d 31, 89 S.Ct. 1623 
( 1969). 
10. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11252. 
11. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 12050 and 
13550 (ATD). No period of residency 
is required for the category Aid to the 
Blind (§ 12550). 
570 
12. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 628, n. 7, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 611, 
n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328, n. 7. 
13. As to the District of Columbia, 
the residency requirements were found 
to be an unconstitutional discrimination 
that violated the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. 394 U.S. 618, 
641-642, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 619-620, 89 
S.Ct. 1322, 1335. 
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depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means 
to subsist-food, shelter and other necessities of life.,,14 
In reviewing the residency decision in light of present wel-
fare litigation, a number of important points emerge. First, 
the Court laid to rest the notion that constitutional chal-
lenges to welfare practices can be answered by the argument 
that welfare is a "privilege and not a right. ,,15 
The Court (while recognizing the interest of the state in 
conserving state funds) flatly rejected the notion that this dis-
crimination between needy persons could be justified as a 
device to save money: 
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in pre-
serving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legiti-
mately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for 
public assistance, public education, or any other pro-
gram. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose 
by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. 
It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for 
education by barring indigent children from its schools. 
Similarly, in the cases before us, appellants must do more 
than show that denying welfare benefits to new residents 
saves money. The saving of the welfare costs cannot 
justify an otherwise invidious classification.16 
The majority also made plain that the traditional equal 
protection test of "any rational basis for the classification"17 
did not apply to the instant case. Rather, the majority held 
that unless the classification was necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, it was unconstitutional. 
There has been considerable debate, following the Supreme 
Court decision in Shapiro, regarding the scope of application 
of the "compelling state interest" test in welfare cases. Some 
argue that the more stringent test was applied only because 
14. 394 U.S. 618, 627, 22 L.Ed.2d 
600,610,89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327. 
15. 394 U.S. 618, 627, 22 L.Ed.2d 
600, 610, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327. 
16. 394 U.S. 618, 633, 22 L.Ed.2d 
600, 614, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1330. 
CAL LAW 1970 
17. Under the traditional standard, 
equal protection is denied only if the 
classification is without any rational 
basis. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic 
Gas Co. 220 U.S. 61, 78, 55 L.Ed. 
369, 377, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340 (1911). 
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constitutional rights were involved (the right to travel), while 
others, including Justice Harlan in dissent,l8 concluded that 
the majority followed a growing line of Supreme Court au-
thority that requires the application of the "compelling in-
terest" test in cases where a classification is based on certain 
suspect criteria (i.e., wealth or race) 19 or affects fundamental 
human rights such as the right to food, shelter, and other basic 
necessities of life.20 
Since the Shapiro decision, only one California federal court 
has squarely faced the question of what equal protection test 
should be applied in reviewing social welfare legislation.1 In 
Macias v. Finch,2 a three-judge court concluded that the com-
pelling state interest test should apply only where a recognized 
constitutional right is directly involved.3 
In the Macias case, the plaintiffs challenged the constitu-
tionality of two provisions of the Social Security Act4 and of 
a state welfare statute5 on equal protection grounds. Their 
principal contention was that the federal act, with its "depriva-
18. 394 u.s. 618, 658, 22 L.Ed.2d 
600, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1344. But 
compare Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion at 394 U.S. 618, 642, 22 L.Ed. 
2d 600, 619, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1335. 
19. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1017, 87 
S.Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967) (race); Harper 
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 668, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 173, 86 S.Ct. 
1079, 1082 (1966) (wealth). 
20. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
68, 71, 20 L.Ed.2d 436, 439, 88 S.Ct. 
1509, 1511 (1968) summarizing the 
cases where the "compelling state inter-
est" or "strict scrutiny" test was applied 
in cases where fundamental human 
rights were involved; see also Skinner v. 
Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541, 86 L.Ed. 
1655,1660,62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113 (1942) 
(right to procreate), and Brown v. Bd. 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L.Ed. 
873, 74 S.Ct. 686, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 
(1954) (right to equal education op-
portunity) . 
572 
1. One welfare case decided prior to 
Shapiro, now on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, applied the traditional test with-
out any discussion of the compelling in-
terest test. Lewis v. Stark, - F.Supp. 
-, No. 50285 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 
1968) prob. juris. noted sub 110m., Lewis 
v. Montgomery (U.S. Nov. 10, 1969, 38 
U.S.L.W.3173). Now styled as Lewis 
v. Martin. 
2. - F.Supp. -, No. 50956 U.S. 
D.C. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970) CCH 
Poverty Law Reporter § 9568, p. 10. 
3. Other recent California welfare 
cases where decisions rested in whole 
or part on equal protection grounds 
did not speak specifically to this issue. 
See, e.g., Kaiser v. Montgomery, - F. 
Supp. -, No. 49613 (N.D. Cal., August 
28, 1969) CCH Poverty Law Reporter 
§ 10,391, p. 11,299. 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 606(a), 607. 
5. Welf. & lust. Code § 11250(c). 
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tion" as well as its "need" requirement, was discriminatory 
in denying aid to children whose fathers were employed full 
time. It was also contended that the statutes, commonly 
referred to as the "Don't Work" rule, discouraged recipients 
from seeking employment. Alternatively, they argued that 
certain federal regulations denying AFDC to families where 
the father was employed more than 30 hours a week (even 
though his earnings were below the welfare standard of need) 
violated the Social Security Act. After reviewing the legis-
lative history of the Social Security Act, the Court rejected 
the plaintiffs' statutory arguments, concluding that Congress 
made eligible only those needy children who were deprived 
of parental support or care by reason of death, continued ab-
sence from the home, physical or mental incapacity, or unem-
ployment of a parent. In the Court's view, a needy child 
not so deprived did not qualify for aid, and HEW did not 
violate the act in defining "unemployment" in terms of the 
number of hours worked rather than in terms of the amount 
earned.6 
Regarding the constitutional claims, the Court held that 
plaintiffs' right to equal protection was not violated by the de-
nial of welfare aid to otherwise eligible needy children solely 
because their father worked more than a given number of 
hours. In so ruling, the Court applied the traditional equal 
protection test of "any rational basis." The "compelling state 
interest" test was rejected despite plaintiffs' argument that the 
recognized constitutional right to seek and hold employ-
ment was penalized by the operation of the challenged 
statutes.7 
Although acknowledging that a constitutional right to em-
ployment was involved, the Court restricted the holding of 
Shapiro by stating that the more stringent equal protection 
test applies to the restrictions on constitutional rights "where 
those restrictions are drawn in terms of suspect classes or 
6. Macias v. Finch, No. 50956, 
u.s. D.C. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970) pp. 
7-10. 
CAL LAW 1970 
7. Macias v. Finch, No. 50956, 
U.S.D.C. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970) pp. 
7-10. 
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to impinge on specifically enumerated rights."8 This conclu-
sion appears to be an improper reading of Shapiro, even if one 
limits its holding to requiring the application of the "compel-
ling state interest" test to cases involving infringement of 
constitutional rights. Certainly, the interference with the 
right to travel in discouraging migration by denying welfare 
aid is essentially the same interference that results in the 
Macias case: namely, the discouragement of full-time em-
ployment if the result of obtaining such employment is a denial 
of welfare assistance to supplement inadequate earnings. 
Once the Macias court decided on the use of the traditional 
equal protection test, the road was open for the acceptance 
of any rational basis for the discrimination, and the plaintiffs' 
claims were denied. It is expected that the case will be ap-
pealed and that other cases raising this equal protection issue 
will be litigated in California. 
Given the growing judicial recognition of the fundamental 
interest a poor person has in the receipt of welfare, the "com-
pelling state interest" test should be applied in scrutinizing 
social welfare legislation that affects an individual's very means 
of subsistence. A recent decision of a three-judge federal court 
unanimously accepted this view. In the case of Rothstein v. 
Wyman,9 a New York welfare statute was found to be uncon-
stitutional on equal protection grounds. Although finding the 
classification unconstitutional under even traditional notions 
of equal protection, the Court emphasized that in welfare 
cases, strict scrutiny of legislation should be undertaken: 
It can hardly be doubted that the subsistence level of our 
indigent and unemployable aged, blind and disabled 
involves a more crucial aspect of life and liberty than the 
right to operate a business on Sunday or to extract gas 
from subsoil. We believe that with the stakes so high 
in terms of human misery the equal protection standard 
to be applied should be stricter than that used upon re-
view of commercial legislation and more nearly approxi-
8. Macias v. Finch, No. 50956, 
U.S.D.C. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 5, 1970) 
p. 13. 
9. 303 F.Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y., 1969). 
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mate that applied to laws affecting fundamental con-
stitutional rights. Poverty is a bitter enough brew. It 
should not be made even less palatable by the addition 
of unjustifiable inequalities or discriminations. It must 
not be forgotten that in most cases public assistance rep-
resents the last resource of those bereft of any alterna-
tive,lO 
Not only are welfare recipients entitled to a court's most 
exacting protection because of the character of the interest 
affected, but such protection is compelled "by the defenseless 
and disadvantaged state of the class of citizens [involved] who 
are usually less able than others to enforce their rights."ll 
Welfare recipients have not had an effective voice in the en-
actment of the laws that affect their lives. They are a minor-
ity usually held in low esteem by the general public. Under 
such circumstances, the need for protection of their rights by 
the courts is essential. As the Supreme Court recognized over 
thirty years ago: 
rP]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may 
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.l2 
The issues in both the Shapiro and Macias cases may result 
in positive legislative action to resolve the welfare problems 
presented. It is generally accepted that the residency decision 
provided a good deal of the impetus for the present adminis-
tration's proposals for minimum national welfare standards 
and for increased federal participation in meeting the cost 
10. 303 F.Supp. 339, 347 (S.D.N.Y., 
1969). In another context, Mr. Justice 
Douglas asked: "Is the right of a per-
son to eat less basic than his right to 
travel which we protected in Edwards 
v. California, 314 U.S. 1601" Bell v. 
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255, 12 L. Ed. 
2d 822, 874, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 1830. 
Clearly not. Such a basic right should 
CAL LAW 1970 
be entitled to the same protections af-
forded other constitutional rights. 
11. 303 F.Supp. 339, 347. 
12. United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts, 304 U.S. 144, 153, n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 
1234, 1241, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, n. 4 
(1938). 
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of public assistance. Similarly, President Nixon's welfare 
proposals13 recognized the cruel irony of denying aid to needy 
families with working fathers while providing aid to equally 
needy families whose fathers are unemployed or out of the 
home. l4 
The other major case decided in 1969 affecting eligibility 
for welfare was Damico v. California.15 Rather than resting 
its decision on constitutional grounds, the Court struck down 
a state eligibility requirement for AFDC as violative of fed-
erallaw. In so ruling, the Court followed the reasoning of the 
United States Supreme Court in its 1968 decision of King v. 
Smith/6 which declared Alabama's "substitute father" welfare 
regulation invalid as inconsistent with the Social Security 
Act.17 
In Damico, plaintiffs (mothers with needy children) were 
separated from their spouses and were denied aid on the basis 
of two California statutes18 that provided, in substance, that 
aid may be granted to needy children deprived of parental 
support or care because of the continued absence of a parent, 
but that no aid may be granted for a separation that has en-
dured less than three months. The state welfare regulations 
excepted families from the three-month rule where legal action 
had been taken to terminate the marriage.19 Plaintiffs contend-
ed that the California statutes violated due process in creating 
a conclusive presumption that the separation was not genuine 
unless it endured for three months or a divorce action had been 
13. Welfare Reform, U.S. Code Con-
gressional and Administrative News, 
Sept. 20, 1969, #8, p. 1233. 
14. Welfare Reform, U.S. Code Con-
gressional and Administrative News, 
Sept. 20, 1969, #8, p. 1233. 
15. Damico v. California, - F.Supp. 
-, No. 46538 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 
1969) CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 
10,477, p. 11,370. 
16. 392 U.S. 309, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 
88 S.Ct. 2128 (1968). 
17. The Damico case is also impor-
576 
tant in welfare litigation since it resulted 
in a 1967 Supreme Court decision hold-
ing that state administrative remedies 
need not be exhausted prior to institut-
ing civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, challenging state welfare laws 
or practices. Damico v. California, 389 
U.S. 416,19 L.Ed.2d 647, 88 S.Ct. 526 
(1967). 
18. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 112S0(b), 
11254. 
19. State Department of Social Wel-
fare, Public Social Services Manual, 
§ 42-311 (1967). 
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filed. Plaintiffs also contended that the statutes discriminated 
against the poor (who could not afford divorce actions) and 
Catholics (by virtue of their being unwilling or unable to file 
for divorce on religious grounds) . 
They pressed other constitutional arguments, but the Court 
found for the plaintiffs on statutory rather than on constitu-
tional grounds. The California statutes were "in conflict with 
the· controlling federal statute and the primary purposes of 
the AFDC program."20 In analyzing the statutes in question, 
the Court recognized that its decision must be controlled by 
the United States Supreme Court's well-supported conclusion 
in King v. Smith that "Congress has determined . . . pro-
tection of dependent children is the paramount goal of 
AFDC."l The Damico court then went on to hold that the 
state statutes, which operated to create a rigid waiting period 
as a precondition to receipt of aid, were contrary to the terms 
of the Social Security Act. The state statutes and regulations 
were found to "clearly [put] administrative convenience ahead 
of the welfare of the needy children. This is not permitted 
under the federal act."2 [Emphasis added.] 
The state's argument that the three-month period was a 
legitimate means to prevent fraud and to keep families to-
gether was also rejected on the basis of King v. Smith. As 
Judge Weigel stated in commenting on King in this regard: 
The Court there recognized the state's legitimate goal 
of preventing immorality and illegitimacy but held that 
the parent's wrongdoing should not be used to deprive 
the children of aid, since the state had other methods 
it could use to deal with such problems. 392 U.S. at 
325-27. The same is true here. The state has many 
possible ways to check the reliability of information 
gathered from potential recipients, and thereby prevent 
20. Damico v. California, - F.Supp. 
-, No. 46538 Civil (N.D. Cal., Sept. 
12, 1969) p. 5. CCH Poverty Law 
Reporter § 10,478, p. 11372. 
1. 392 U.S. 309, 325, 20 L.Ed.2d 
1118, 1130, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2137. 
CAL LAW 1970 
2. The Damico court relied on King 
v. Smith as authority for this proposi-
tion. Damico v. California, - F. Supp. 
-, No. 46538 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 
1969) p. 7. CCH Poverty Law Re-
porter § 10,478, p. 11,373. 
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fraud ab initio. It also may punish those who are sub-
sequently found to have obtained benefits fraudulently. 
But it may not, consistently with the AFDC program, 
deny benefits to many eligible and needy children in order 
to avoid granting benefits to those few children whose 
parents have applied fraudulently. 
Defendants further argue that the three-month wait-
ing period furthers the legitimate state interest of keeping 
families together, since parents will be less likely to sepa-
rate if they know the children will have to wait three 
months for aid. This legitimate interest is clearly pro-
moted by means impermissible under the federal Act, 
because it postulates deprivation of the children as the 
club to keep the parents together. Moreover, the argu-
ment does not focus on the crucial inquiries which must 
be made: Are the children eligible and needy? Is the 
absence of the parent 'continued'?8 
There still remain many welfare practices and laws in 
California that place administrative convenience ahead of 
the needs of the poor,4 that penalize children for the actions of 
their parents,6 and that exclude from aid persons entitled to 
assistance under federallaw. 6 In all probability, the next year 
3. Damico v. California, - F. Supp. 
-, No. 46538 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 
1969) pp. 7, 8. CCH Poverty Law Re-
porter pp. 11373-11374. In holding 
that the state statutes were invalid, the 
court stressed California could still con-
sider the length of the absence as one 
of the factors in determining whether a 
"continued absence" existed (recogniz-
ing that in appropriate cases, a bona fide 
separation might exist after a few days), 
but that the state could not deny aid to 
needy children who in fact were de-
prived and therefore eligible for aid un-
der the federal act on the basis of a con-
clusive presumption. 
4. See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code § 
11351, and the discussion of the Lewis 
v. Montgomery decision, infra. 
578 
5. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11477, re-
quires the termination of welfare aid to 
needy children if their mother refuses 
to sign a criminal complaint against 
their father or fails otherwise to coop-
erate with law enforcement officials. 
Recently, a suit challenging the validity 
of this provision on constitutional stat-
utory grounds was filed in San Fran-
cisco. Taylor v. Montgomery, No. C-
69-666 Civil (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 
30, 1969, Peckham, J.) (three-
judge court convened and temporary re-
straining order issued Dec. 30, 1969). 
A three-judge court in Connecticut re-
cently invalidated a similar regulation. 
Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp 761 (D. 
Conn., 1969). 
6. WeI. & Inst. Code § 11253. Un-
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will see more cases challenging these practices and statutes by 
emphasizing the principles established in King v. Smith and 
followed in Damico v. California. 
B. Cases Challenging the Level of Welfare Payments 
While the court decisions affecting eligibility were decided 
in the main on constitutional or sharply contested statutory 
grounds, litigation affecting the level of welfare payments 
proved to be quite different. In most cases, the recipients 
were asserting clearly defined rights under federal and state 
law that had been too long ignored by the administrators 
of public assistance in California. 
Of the five cases decided in 1969, all but one (now on 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court) were decided in 
favor of the recipients.7 In each of the cases save one, re-
cipients were found to have been illegally deprived of welfare 
benefits to which they were entitled as a matter of law. The 
situation becomes more startling when it is recognized that 
of the four decisions in favor of the recipients, only one was 
decided on constitutional grounds.s In the other cases, courts 
found clear and obvious violations of state and federal law 
that resulted in the denial of assistance to thousands of re-
cipients.9 
der federal law, all eligible persons are 
entitled to assistance. Eligible children 
in the AFDC program are defined as 
those needy children under the age of 
18. California, however, denies aid to 
children between 16-18 unless they 
meet additional state-imposed eligibility 
requirements. (They must be in school, 
in a training program, or employed.) 
Under the reasoning of King v. Smith, 
California has narrowed the definition 
of "child" to exclude otherwise eligible 
children as Alabama did in creating its 
own definition of "parent," and there-
by violated the Social Security Act's 
mandate "that all eligible individuals re-
ceive aid." One case in California that 
developed this argument resulted in the 
convening of a three-judge federal court 
CAL LAW 1970 
and the issuance of a temporary re-
straining order enjoining the denial of 
aid on the basis of Welf. & lnst. Code 
§ 11253 to a 17-year-old boy. Kerr 
v. Montgomery, No. 50520 (N.D. Cal., 
Filed Dec. 30, 1968). The case was 
later voluntarily dismissed as moot. 
7. In commenting on the State Wel-
fare Department's record in recent wel-
fare cases, an unnamed state official 
lamented: "We don't have a good bat-
ting average in the courts." Wall Street 
Journal, page 7 (Wednesday, February 
4, 1970). 
8. Kaiser v. Montgomery, CCH Pov-
erty Law Reporter § 10,391, p. 11,299. 
9. Ivy v. Montgomery Sup. Ct. S. F. 
Cty. (No. 592705 Sept. 11, 1969); Nes-
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21
Sitkin: Welfare Law in California
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
WeHare Law 
Not only have the cases reflected a pattern of law violation 
on the part of the welfare bureaucracy of this state, but the 
post-judgment history of two of these cases reflects a pattern 
of intentional avoidance of court judgments.1o It is indeed 
ironic that a state administration that is so strident in urging 
compliance with law and order fails to follow the law when the 
poor and their welfare are at stake. 
To appreciate the significance of the decisions of 1969, 
it is essential to describe briefly the setting in which the cases 
arose. The California Department of Social Welfare (through 
the counties) is required to make payments to needy children 
under the AFDC program in accordance with the provisions 
of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11450, 11452, and 
11454. Pursuant to section 11452, the department is charged 
with determining each recipient's minimum need. In making 
that determination, the department has computed for each 
county a "Cost Schedule for Family Budget Units." This 
cost schedule sets forth amounts representing the allowances 
for the following items: housing, food, clothing, personal 
needs, recreation, transportation, household operations, edu-
cation and incidentals, utilities, and intermittent needs. ll The 
amounts in the cost schedule for these items vary ~ccording to 
such factors as a recipient's age, sex, and county of r~sidence~12 
In establishing the amounts, the state department is required 
to set the cost of the items in conformity with the mandate 
of section 11452 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. For 
example, housing allowances are to be established to il1sure 
that the amounts contained in the schedules reflect the mini-
mum cost of "safe, healthful housing."lS In practice, the 
bitt v. Montgomery Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. 
(No. 193675 Oct. 1, 1969); C.C.H. Pov-
erty Law Reporter § 10,645 p. 11,513; 
Daley v. State Department of Social 
Welfare, 276 Cal. App.2d 961, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 318 (1969). 
10. Ivy v. Montgomery Sup. Ct. San 
Francisco Cty. (No. 592705, Sept. 11, 
1969); Nesbitt v. Montgomery Sup. Ct. 
Sac. Cty. (No. 193675, Oct. 1, 1969) 
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,645, 
p. 11,513. 
580 
11. California Department of Social 
Welfare, Manual of Policies and Pro-
cedures (PSS) § 44-221.1-.21 and, gen-
erally, all of chapter 44 of the Manual. 
Also Kaiser v. Montgomery No. 49613 
Civil (N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) 
p.2. 
12. Kaiser v. Montgomery, No. 
49613 Civil (N.D. Cal., August 28, 
1969) p. 2. CCH Poverty Law Report-
er § 10,391, p. 11,300. 
13. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11452(a). 
CAL LAW 1970 22
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 20
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20
Welfare Law 
amounts contained in the cost schedules do not reflect the 
average minimum cost of many items in the standard, and, in 
a number of instances, the amounts are grossly inadequate.14 
Once a family's needs are determined by the use of a cost 
schedule (and any special nonrecurring needs are added), 
the county welfare department calculates the amount of non-
exempt income the family has available. If the family's mini-
mum need exceeds its available income, the family has met the 
"need" requirement for AFDC. Pursuant to section 11454, 
a family is to be paid the amount of its minimum needs cal-
culated pursuant to section 11452 (or that amount of its mini-
mum needs not met by available income) unless that amount 
exceeds the ceilings on aid payments established by section 
11450 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. This stat-
ute arbitrarily places a limit on the amount of money the 
state will pay an AFDC family regardless of the amount of its 
state-determined minimum needs.15 These ceilings are com-
monly referred to as "maximum grants.,,16 
14. Food allowances are on the av-
erage substantially below the levels set 
by Welf. & Inst. Code § 11452. Each 
recipient's monthly transportation al-
lowance (set in 1950) is $1.00 (less than 
the cost of three round-trip bus fares in 
San Francisco). As to the inadequacy 
of the housing allowances, see discus-
sion of Ivy v. Montgomery, infra. 
15. The maximum grants vary only 
with the size of a family and do not 
take age, sex, or county of residence 
of a recipient into account. The maxi-
ma have no relationship to the 
state-determined needs of a family. 
In almost all cases, the maximum 
grant ceiling for a family is less than 
their state-determined needs. Unless 
outside income is received by a fam-
ily to supplement their monthly income 
up to their state-determined needs, 
they must live on maximum payments 
set by Welf. & Inst. Code § 11450(a). 
The counties have the option under 
Welf. & Inst. Code § 11451 of paying 
CAL LAW 1970 
the recipients additional sums from 
county funds to meet their state-de-
termined needs, but only Marin county 
does this. 
16. The maximum grants payable un-
der the statute are as follows: 
Children Living with One 
Parent or Other Relative 
Number 
of Children 
1 
2 ..................... . 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Amount 
148 
172 
221 
263 
300 
330 
355 
373 
386 
392 
399 
405 
412 
418 
424 
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Approximately one-half of the recipients of AFDC in Cali-
fornia (by virtue of the maximum grant limitation of section 
11450(a» subsist on incomes that are below their state-de-
termined minimum needs.17 This fact, coupled with the real-
ization that the state standards of need are set far below the 
amounts actually necessary for a minimum basic standard of 
adequate care, places the need for a raise in welfare grants 
beyond debate. 
Two of the cases decided in 1969 resulted in judicial hold-
ings that (1) California's maximum grant statute is uncon-
stitutional, and that (2) California's present standards of need 
in the AFDC program are illegal and inadequate as a matter 
of state law. . 
The first of these cases, Kaiser v. Montgomery/8 was 
brought by a number of AFDC families who received welfare 
grants below their state-determined needs. The suit was 
brought as a class action on behalf of all other similarly situat-
ed families. The plaintiffs contended that section 11450 (a) 
was unconstitutional, since the limitations imposed by the stat-
ute (1) lacked any reasonable basis in light of the purposes of 
the aid program, and (2) arbitrarily deprived certain AFDC 
recipients of assistance sufficient to meet their state-determined 
need. 
In a 2-1 decision, the federal Court held the statute to be 
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 19 A preliminary injunction was issued enjoining 
Children Living with 
Two Eligible Parents 
Number Amount 
of Children 
1 ...................... 166 
2 ...................... 191 
3 ...................... 239 
4 ...................... 282 
5 ...................... 318 
6 ...................... 349 
7 ...................... 373 
8 ...................... 392 
9 ...................... 404 
10 ...................... 411 
11 ...................... 417 
582 
12 ...................... 424 
13 ...................... 430 
14 ...................... 437 
15 ...................... 443 
Plus $6.00 for each additional child 
17. Kaiser v. Montgomery, No. 
49613 Civil USDC (N.D. Cal., August 
28, 1969) CCH Poverty Law Reporter 
§ 10,391, p. 11,300, n. 2. 
18. - F.Supp. -, No. 49613 Civil 
(N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) CCH 
Poverty Law Reporter § 10,391, p. 11,-
299. 
19. - F.Supp. -, No. 49613 Civil 
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its further enforcement,20 but the Court later stayed its injunc-
tion pending appeal of the case to the United States Supreme 
Court.1 The majority found that the maximum grant statute 
lacked a reasonable relationship to the needs of AFDC re-
cipients because the limitations it imposed took no account of 
those factors the state itself used in determining need (i.e., age, 
sex, unmet work expenses, and cost of living in each county) 
nor did it take a reasonable account of family size in determin-
ing need. In analyzing the discrimination effected by the 
statute, the Court observed that it operated with particular 
harshness against large AFDC families. The majority cited 
several examples of the effect of the statute on the plaintiffs' 
families. One plaintiff, a mother with two teenage and two 
subteen age children, needed $300 a month to subsist accord-
ing to the state's own figures. Section 11450 (a), however, 
permits a family of four needy children and one needy parent 
only $263 on which to live. Another plaintiff, the mother 
of eleven children all of whom were eligible to receive bene-
fits, had a monthly state-determined need of $532. But ac-
cording to section 11450 (a), the family could receive no more 
than $399 per month. Therefore, this woman received $133 
less per month than the state considered minimally necessary 
to provide clothing, food, shelter, and other necessities for her-
self and her children. 
(N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) CCH 
Poverty Law Reporter p. 11,303. 
20. - F.Supp. -, No. 49613 Civil 
(N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) p. 10; 
CCH Poverty Law Reporter p. 11,-
303. 
1. The order granting the stay was 
issued on Nov. 17, 1969, and is unre-
ported. In all probability, the case will 
be decided on a summary basis by the 
Supreme Court (as was the case with 
California residency decision) since an-
other "maximum grant" case has al-
ready been argued before the Supreme 
Court. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. 
Supp. 450 (D.Md., 1968) sub nom. Dan-
dridge v. Williams, prob. juris. noted 
CAL LAW 1970 
October 14, 1969 (38 USLW 3127). 
(After submission of this article, the 
United States Supreme Court in a 5-3 
decision, upheld the constitutionality of 
Maryland's maximum grants applying 
the traditional equal protection test of 
"any rational basis." The Supreme 
Court limited the "compelling state in-
terest" test to cases where constitutional 
rights were involved. (- U.S. -, 25 
L.Ed.2d 491, 90 S.Ct. 1153,38 U.S.L.W. 
4277 (1970).) On April 20, 1970, the 
Court vacated the decision in Kaiser v. 
Montgomery and remanded the case 
for further consideration in light of 
Dandridge (38 U.S.L.W. 3405).) 
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In holding the statute unconstitutional, the majority fol-
lowed similar federal court decisions in three other jurisdic-
tions.a The fact that these other decisions involved absolute 
ceilings on aid to families, while California's statute permits a 
maximum increase of $6 per child regardless of a family size, 
did not prove a significant reason for distinguishing those cases 
from the Kaiser case. The Court simply noted that the $6 in-
crement did not come anywhere near closing the gap between 
child need and the actual aid received by children in large 
families. s 
The Court was careful to delineate the scope of its holding. 
It was not making any determinations regarding the actual 
needs of recipients or suggesting that the state must furnish 
children with aid covering those needs.4 The majority direct-
ed its attention solely to the constitutionality of section 11450 
(a), and the method of payment it commands: 
We say only that, the state having chosen to make ex-
penditures to promote the welfare of needy children, 
those expenditures may not be made in such a way as to 
discriminate irrationally among the recipients. The lim-
itations imposed by § 11450(a) create the forbidden ir-
rational discrimination among recipients and that portion 
of § 11450 (a) is therefore unconstitutional. 5 
2. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. 
Supp. 450 (D.Md., 1968), sub nom. 
Dandridge v. Williams (U.S. prob. 
juris. noted October 14, 1969, argued 
on Dec. 13, 1969); Westberry v. Fisher, 
297 F.Supp. 1109 (D.Me. 1969); and 
Dews v. Henry, 297 F.Supp. 587 (D. 
Arizona, 1969). Another similar deci-
sion not cited by the majority was Lind-
sey v. Smith, 303 F.Supp. 1203 (W.D. 
Wash., 1969) CCH Poverty Law Re-
porter § 10,278, p. 11,223. 
3. As the majority noted: "The stat-
utory increment of $6.00 for each child 
after the ninth fails by at least $13 .00 to 
meet the state-determined need of such 
child for food alone." CCH Poverty 
Law Reporter § 10,391, p. 11,301, n. 5. 
584 
Kaiser v. Montgomery, No. 49613 Civil 
USDC (N.D. Cal., August 28, 1969) 
p.6. 
4. The question of whether a state 
must pay recipients their state-deter-
mined minimum needs was not raised 
by plaintiffs in Kaiser. It remains an 
open question raising state, federal, and 
constitutional issues of great magnitude. 
Given the present plight in which most 
recipients find themselves, in all prob-
ability it will be an issue facing the 
courts in the next several years. 
5. Kaiser v. Montgomery, No. 49613 
Civil USDC (N.D. Cal., August 28, 
1969) pp. 9-10, and Kaiser v. Mont-
gomery, CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 
10,392, p. 11,303. 
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As noted earlier, another case decided in 1969 found the 
state-determined standards of need to be inadequate and in 
clear violation of state law. In the case of Ivy v. Mont-
gomery,6 plaintiffs, recipients of AFDC, brought a class action 
on behalf of recipients in San Francisco and Alameda Coun-
ties, as well as all other counties in the state. They challenged 
the validity of the minimum standards of need for the AFDC 
program, which are set forth in cost schedules issued on a 
county-by-county basis.7 Although the action challenged the 
validity of all cost schedules in California (which contain 
specific dollar figures for each of the items of need), the suit 
focused primarily on the State Welfare Department's proce-
dure for establishing the housing component of the need stand-
ard. 
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 11452, the 
State Welfare Department has a mandatory duty to establish 
standards of need that reflect, inter alia, the minimum cost for 
safe, healthful housing. The plaintiffs first alleged that the 
department's regulation,8 which required only that the 
counties establish housing allowances based on actual costs 
of housing rather than on the minimum cost of safe, 
healthful housing, was in conflict with the governing statute. 
It was further alleged that the cost schedules in Alameda and 
San Francisco Counties, and in all other counties of the state, 
were invalid, since the housing allowances contained therein 
were much below the minimum standard of safe, healthful 
housing required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 
11452. It was also alleged that the housing allowances in the 
cost schedules were far below the actual costs of housing and 
therefore violated the department's own regulation. Finally, 
it was contended that all the cost schedules were invalid be-
cause they were adopted without notice or the opportunity for 
a hearing as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
After a full trial in which virtually all the essential facts 
6. Sup. Ct., San Francisco Cty., No. suant to the state Public Social Services 
592705. (Judgment entered September Manual (PSS) § 44-212. 
11, 1969, Alvin E. Weinberger, J.) 8. Public Social Services Manual 
7. The cost schedules are issued pur- (PSS) § 44-212. 
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were stipulated to by the defendant State Department of Social 
Welfare (including a stipulation that the application of present 
cost schedules resulted in irreparable injury and malnutrition 
among welfare children), 9 Superior Court Judge Alvin Wein-
berger sustained all of plaintiffs' contentions. He ruled that 
all of the cost schedules were invalid, having been adopted 
without notice and hearing as required by the Administrative 
Procedure Act. lO Judge Weinberger further held that the cost 
schedules violated both the state's own regulation and the 
mandate of section 11452, since the housing allowances con-
tained therein were below the actual cost of housing as re-
flected in county samples in the possession of the defendants 
and were even further below the minimum costs of safe, health-
ful housing. Finally, the trial judge held that the state's "ac-
tual rent" regulation violated the governing statute-Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 11452.11 
In reaching his decision, the trial judge made a number of 
significant findings that illustrate the magnitude of the depart-
ment's violation of state law. Based on stipulated facts, it was 
found: 
1. The housing allowances in San Francisco County for 
1968 varied between $52 a month for 2 persons to 
$80 for 10 persons.12 
2. The minimum costs of safe, healthful housing in San 
Francisco County varied between $100 for 2 per-
sons to $200 for 10 persons in 1968.13 
3. The average actual housing cost in San Francisco in 
1969 according to the State Welfare Department's 
9. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law entered Sept. 
11, 1969, Findings of Fact No. 45. For 
more general information on malnutri-
tion among welfare recipients, see Citi-
zens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and 
Malnutrition in the United States, 
Hunger, USA p. 28 at 72 (1968), and 
Le Beaux, "Life on ADC: Budgets of 
Despair," in Poverty in America, p. 519 
at 523-26 (Ferman, Kornbluh, and 
Haber, eds., 1968). 
586 
10. Govt. Code §§ 11423-11425. 
11. Ivy v. Montgomery, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment entered on Sep-
tember 11, 1969. 
12. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No. 14. 
13. Ivy. v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No. 15. 
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own data was approximately $23 higher than the 
average housing aIlowance.I4 
4. The gap between the AFDC allowance for rent and 
the minimum rents actually paid for safe, healthful 
housing can only be met out of the subsistence 
amount allowed for other living necessities such as 
food and clothing. For every rent dollar paid above 
the AFDC allowance, the recipient has one dol-
lar less than she needs for the other needs of her 
family.I5 
5. The application of the 1967, 1968, and 1969 Cost 
Schedules in determining AFDC recipients' grants 
has resulted in irreparable injury, including mal-
nutrition and ascertainable monetary loss among 
AFDC families. I6 
6. The housing allowances contained in the Cost Sched-
ules (except for annual cost-of-living increases be-
gun in 1966 and a Federal pass-through increase) 
are based on actual housing costs computed in 1950, 
effective June 1951.17 
The defendants raised no serious defense to the action, but 
maintained that no funds were available to meet the costs of 
a judgment. The trial court ruled that the defense was legally 
insufficient to prevent the entry of a judgment for plaintiffs. IS 
The court found that plaintiffs did not have the burden of 
establishing the existence of available funds to obtain the relief 
sought, and further, that the General Fund of the State is avail-
able to meet the cost of unanticipated welfare expenditures 
above the budget limitation set in section 32.5 of the Budget 
Act if such expenditures are occasioned by rule or regula-
tion change required by court order. I9 
14. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No.8. 
15. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No. 23. 
16. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No. 45. 
17. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No. 20. 
CAL LAW 1970 
18. Ivy v. Montgomery, Conclusions 
of Law No. 16. The same conclusion 
was reached by Judge B. Abbott Gold-
berg in the case of Nesbitt v. Mont-
gomery, discussed infra. 
19. Ivy v. Montgomery, Conclusions 
of Law Nos. 25 and 26. 
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The court also found that the state had not submitted any 
evidence to support its claim that no funds were available.20 
Indeed, all of the evidence before the court demonstrated that 
more than ample funds were available to satisfy the judgment. l 
On September 11, 1969, judgment was rendered in the case. 
The Court enjoined further application of the invalid cost 
schedules and ordered the State Welfare Director to imme-
diately issue new cost schedules that would comply with the 
statutory mandate of safe, healthful housing.2 
In light of the possible administrative complexity in issuing 
cost schedules that would comply with the mandate of Wel-
fare and Institutions Code section 11452, the Court further 
ordered, as an interim measure and incidental to the pro-
hibition against further application of the invalid cost sched-
ules, that the State Welfare Department at least comply with 
their own regulations pending adoption of new cost schedules, 
and pay actual rents to the plaintiffs and similarly situated 
families in San Francisco and Alameda Counties to prevent 
further irreparable injury occurring in the period between 
judgment and the adoption of valid cost schedules.3 
Shortly after judgment, the State Welfare Department held 
public hearings to determine the actual costs of safe, healthful 
housing and the other items of need for use in the cost sched-
ules. Other than holding hearings in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the State Welfare Department 
took no other action to comply with the Court's judgment 
until contempt proceedings were instituted against the State 
Welfare Director. The trial court in its judgment had given 
the state until October 15, 1969, to comply with its interim 
payment order in San Francisco and Alameda Counties.4 No 
20. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No. 59. 
1. Ivy v. Montgomery, Findings of 
Fact No. 56. The "availability of 
funds" defense has no application in 
these welfare cases as a matter of law 
and fact. It is no more than a clever 
tactic aimed at persuading courts to 
avoid their responsibility to declare in-
valid and to enjoin illegal state welfare 
588 
practices. Fortunately, the courts faced 
with this argument have recognized its 
irrelevance and have squarely rejected 
the defense. 
2. Ivy v Montgomery, Judgment, p. 
3, paragraphs 1 and 3. 
3. Ivy v. Montgomery, Judgment, p. 
3, paragraph 2. 
4. The court ordered that the pay-
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payments were made on October 15. On October 21, the 
state took an appeal from the judgment and asserted that its 
appeal stayed the effect of the interim payment order. How-
ever, the state acknowledged that it was appealing only that 
portion of the judgment regarding the interim payments.5 
Thus, the trial court's determination that all of the existing 
cost schedules violated state law and that new schedules would 
have to be immediately issued became final. 
After the state had failed, for over two months, to comply 
with the court's judgment, the plaintiffs moved for and ob-
tained an order from the trial judge declaring the judgment not 
stayed pending appeaLs The trial court, however, stayed the 
effect of its order until the 15th of December, to allow 
the state to apply for a writ of supersedeas in the Court of 
Appeal. The court made it clear that if a writ was not issued, 
its judgment would have to be complied with by December 
15, 1969, or the State Welfare Director would face contempt 
proceedings.7 
The Court of Appeal denied the State Welfare Department's 
application for a writ of supersedeas.s The state failed to 
comply with the court's order on the 15th of December, and 
contempt proceedings were instituted shortly thereafter. A 
hearing was held on December 30, 1969, which was continued 
until January 13,1970, at which time the State Welfare Direc-
tor indicated that finally (some four and a half months after 
jUdgment) he was going to direct the payment of actual rent in 
the two named counties, and that he was going to issue new 
cost schedules containing increased housing allowances by 
the end of February effective the 1 st of June. The trial judge 
ordered the adoption of new cost schedules by February 1, 
ments be made retroactive to the date 
of judgment. 
5. Defendants-Appellants' Petition 
for Writ of Supersedeas dated Decem-
ber 12, 1969, filed in the first District 
Court of Appeal, No. 27614, at p. 3. 
6. Order Declaring Judgment is Not 
Stayed Pending Appeal entered Decem-
ber 1, 1969. 
CAL LAW 1970 
7. Order Declaring Judgment is Not 
Stayed Pending Appeal, entered Decem-
ber 1, 1969. 
8. Order Denying Petition for Writ 
of Supersedeas and Temporary Re-
straining Order dated December 15, 
1969, District Court of Appeal (lst 
Dept., Div. 3), No. 27614. 
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1970, and their implementation in all counties by March 
1, 1970, continuing the contempt hearing until March 12, 
1970. 
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the contempt pro-
ceeding and the individual responsibility of the members of the 
State Welfare Department, Finance Department, and execu-
tive branch of government, the fact remains that state officials 
defied a lawful court order for several months, a court order 
that (except for interim relief) was not being appealed by the 
state. 
The defiance of a court order by the State Welfare Depart-
ment was not limited to the Ivy case. A similar pattern was 
repeated in another case, Nesbitt v. Montgomery.9 In Nesbitt, 
the State Welfare Department was again found to be acting 
in direct violation of the law. This time, however, the viola-
tion was of federal as well as state law. The department's 
regulation establishing the method for exempting a portion of 
a working AFDC recipient's earnings was held to conflict with 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1100810 and binding 
federal regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfarell pursuant to the Social Security Act 
amendment of 1967.12 As a result, some 28,000 families in 
California were illegally deprived of an average of $28 per 
month in welfare payments.13 The loss of welfare resulted 
from the State Welfare Department's regulation requiring that 
the federal earning exemption be applied against a recipi-
9. Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. No. 193675, 
Dept. 4 (Memorandum Decision en-
tered Oct. 1, 1969, B. Abbott Goldberg, 
J.) CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10,645, 
p. 11,513. 
10. In relevant part, Welf. & Inst. 
Code § 11008 reads: 
"To the maximum extent permitted by 
federal law, earned income of a re-
cipient of aid under any public as-
sistance program for which federal 
funds are available shall not be consid-
ered income or resources of the recip-
ient, and shall not be deducted from 
590 
the amount of aid to which the recipient 
would otherwise be entitled." 
11. The HEW regulations were is-
sued on Jan. 29, 1969, in The Federal 
Register, effective on publication. 34 
Fed. Reg. No. 19, pp. 1394, 1396. 
They were later recodified at 45 Code 
Fed. Reg. § 233.20(a)(7); see also 45 
Code Fed. Reg. § 233.20(a)(11)(ii). 
12. 81 Stat. 881 (1968), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602. 
13. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No. 
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. 
(October 1, 1969) P 16. 
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ent's net rather than gross earnings.14 Not only were re-
cipients deprived of benefits to which they were legally en-
titled, but one of the major goals of social welfare-encourag-
ing recipients to work-was compromised by the department's 
illegal rule. I5 
During the litigation, defendants conceded that their regula-
tion was in conflict with the HEW regulation,I6 but still argued 
that no judicial redress was available to the recipient plaintiffs. 
Judge B. Abbott Goldberg, in a well-documented opinion, 
held to the contrary, and enjoined the further application of 
the invalid regulation. His decision was not appealed by the 
state. In so ruling, Judge Goldberg made a number of sig-
nificant points regarding the ability of welfare recipients to 
seek judicial redress for violations of their rights under state 
and federal law. First, Judge Goldberg found that the re-
cipients had standing to challenge the validity of a state wel-
fare regulation as violative of federal or state law in state 
court. 17 The fact that the Secretary of HEW had not acted to 
enforce his own regulation was no bar to judicial action by 
aggrieved recipients. IS Judge Goldberg also found that state 
courts could hear and resolve actions created by federal law.I9 
14. The Secretary of HEW summa-
rized the federal regulations' require-
ment as follows: 
"The method for disregard of earned 
income has been modified. In arriving 
at the amount of earned income to be 
applied against the assistance budget the 
amount to be disregarded is to be de-
ducted from gross income rather than 
from net income. Next, the amount 
allowed for work expenses is to be de-
ducted. The remaining amount is then 
applied against the assistance budget 
(§ 233.20(a)(7»." 33 Fed. Reg. No. 19, 
p. 1394 (Jan. 29, 1969). 
15. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11205, pro-
vides in relevant part: 
"It is the intent of the Legislature 
that the employment and self-mainte-
nance of parents of needy children be 
encouraged to the maximum extent and 
CAL LAW 1970 
that this chapter shall be administered 
in such a way that needy children and 
their parents will be encouraged and 
inspired to assist in their own mainte-
nance. The [state] department [of 
Social Welfare] shall take all steps nec-
essary to implement this section." 
16. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No. 
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. (Oc-
tober 1, 1969) p. 5. 
17. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No. 
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. 
(October 1, 1969) pp. 8-12. 
18. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No. 
193675 Dept 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. 
(October 1, 1969) pp. 6-7. 
19. Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 
CaI.2d 818, 851, 142 P.2d 297, 316 
(1943). Judge Goldberg concluded that 
petitioners not only had standing to 
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With regard to standing under state law, Judge Goldberg 
found the petitioners "interested person[s]" within the mean-
ing of Government Code section 11440, because the regula-
tions directly affected them, and "beneficially interested" 
within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, 
because they had sufficient reason to challenge the regulation.20 
Judge Goldberg also concluded that petitioners did not have 
to exhaust their administrative remedies before instituting 
court action. After carefully analyzing the relevant author-
ities, Judge Goldberg held that: 
[P]etitioners may obtain a judicial determination of 
the validity of the regulation by resorting to Gov. C. 
§ 11440, or traditional mandamus, Brock v. Superior 
Court, supra, 109 Cal. App.2d at 603 without exhaust-
ing the administrative remedies provided by Welfare 
and Institutions Code §§ 10950 et seq.l 
As in the Ivy case, the state's defense of lack of funds was 
rejected as a matter of law.2 
On November 17, 1969, Judge Goldberg entered judgment 
in the Nesbitt case enjoining forthwith the further application 
of the state welfare regulation and declaring that the gross 
rather than net income method of computing earning exemp-
tions should have been applied since at least January 29, 1969 
(the effective date of the federal regulation). Although the 
State Welfare Department issued an emergency regulation 
shortly after the court decision, it was not, by its terms, to re-
place the invalid regulation until February 1, 1970 (some two 
and a half months after judgment).3 
maintain the proceeding, but also that 
the Court must hear the case. 
20. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No. 
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. 
(October 1, 1969) p. 12. 
1. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No. 
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. (Oc-
tober 1, 1969) p. 14. 
2. Nesbitt v. Montgomery, No. 
193675 Dept. 4, Sup. Ct. Sac. Cty. (Oc-
592 
tober 1, 1969) pp. 10-21. The Court 
reviewed the leading authorities on this 
question and found that unavailability 
of funds is no impediment to the entry 
of a judgment against the state. How-
ever, as in Ivy, the state failed to submit 
any evidence to support its claim that 
funds were unavailable. 
3. Not only were the emergency reg-
ulations not to become operative until 
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As in Ivy, contempt proceedings were instituted and, after 
hearing, Judge Goldberg issued a peremptory writ of man-
date directing immediate repeal of the newly adopted regula-
tions.4 Of significance in terms of the State Welfare Depart-
ment's pattern of law violation was the finding made by Judge 
Goldberg after the contempt hearing: 
. . . the former respondent John Montgomery as 
Director of Social Welfare, and the former respondent 
Paul C. Zimmer, as Acting Director of Social Welfare, 
together with their counsel, engaged in a course of con-
duct designed to impede the enforcement of this Court's 
judgment of November 17, 1969. The Court finds fur-
ther, that since Montgomery has left the jurisdiction and 
since Zimmer no longer acts as director, it is not expedi-
ent or necessary to proceed against them for their per-
sonal derelictions in regard to the judgment of November 
17, 1969. The Court finds further that the present re-
spondent, Robert Martin, as Director of Social Welfare, 
is continuing the conduct of his two predecessors in viola-
tion of the judgment.6 
While the actions of the State Welfare Department may 
have been motivated by fiscal or economic considerations, the 
fact remains that these interests, as valid as they might be, 
must be subservient to the rule of law. As the poor 
have so often been told, the law must be obeyed until it is 
changed through the legislative process. So long as the laws 
are in force, they are binding even on state administrators, 
and the courts must be looked to as the forum where the rights 
of the poor may be vindicated. 
Despite the court victories in the Ivy and Nesbitt cases, it is 
apparent that the State Welfare Department benefited from its 
violations of law for considerable periods of time before judg-
ment was rendered in those cases. Welfare payments il-
legally denied recipients prior to judgment will in most cases 
February 1, 1970, but they were conced- 4. Peremptory Writ of Mandate filed 
ed to be in violation of the court's judg- and entered Jan. 13, 1970. 
ment of November 17, 1969. 5. Minute Order dated Jan. 13, 1970. 
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be reflected as savings in state welfare costs. Until judg-
ment, therefore, the state loses nothing by its violation of law. 
Probably because of the sums involved, some trial courts have 
been reluctant to grant retroactive payments or order the de-
partment to take effective corrective action to remedy the past 
hardship caused by illegal regulations or practices. This situa-
tion should not and cannot continue, for it encourages the 
type of law violations exemplified by the cases discussed here-
in. Recipients are entitled to those benefits illegally denied 
them by the state. Equally important, the state must be held 
responsible for its illegal actions and should not benefit from 
its own wrongs. The right of recipients to receive retroactive 
payments and the need for such relief was recognized by the 
California Supreme Court over twenty-five years ago: 
In the case now before us we are of the view that the 
provisions for appeal to the State Social Welfare Board 
and for 'the payments, if awarded, to commence from the 
date the applicant was first entitled thereto' likewise sub-
serve a clear public purpose by securing to those en-
titled to aid the full payment thereof 'from the date . . . 
[they were] first entitled thereto' regardless of errors or 
delays by local authorities. It was the mandatory duty 
of the county to furnish aid according to the plan there-
for which is laid down by the applicable provisions of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code [citations omitted]. The 
bare fact that an applicant has by one means or another 
managed to ward off starvation pending receipt of the 
payments to which he was previously entitled provides 
no sufficient excuse for a county to refuse to make such 
payments. To hold otherwise would, as suggested by 
petitioner herein, provide a money-saving device for the 
counties at the expense of those of our citizenry least 
able to bear the burden thereof.6 
Violations of state law by the State Welfare Department 
were not limited to the AFDC program. The Court of Ap-
6. Board of Social Welfare v. Los Proctor v. S. F. Port Authority, 266 
Angeles County, 27 Cal.2d 81, 85-86, Cal. App.2d 675, 72 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1st 
162 P.2d 630, 633 (1945); compare Dist., 1968). 
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peal, in the case of Daley v. State Department of Social Wel-
fare,7 recently held that the exclusion of increases in the cost 
of medical care -from consumer price indices for the purpose 
of computing increases payable under welfare programs for 
the blind, potentially self-supporting blind, disabled, and 
elderly, did not conform to statutory directives8 that such in-
dices be used as a basis for computing changes in payments, 
and were therefore invalid. The exclusion of the medical care 
component resulted in a loss of $2 a month to recipients of 
blind aid and $1 a month to elderly and disabled recipients.9 
(Although these sums might appear to be small, any recipient 
living at a subsistence level can testify that the loss of one dol-
lar is significant.) 10 To justify its action, the State Welfare 
Department contended that the elimination of the medical 
care component was proper, since medical expenses were be-
ing met by public payments under other programs. In answer-
ing this contention, the court indicated that the department's 
thesis was one properly addressed to the legislature, but that it 
could not justify the department's unilateral amendment of 
existing state law. 
In reaching its decision, the Daley court quoted from the 
State Supreme Court decision in Morris v. Williams, which en-
joined illegal state cuts in the Medi-Cal program: 11 
Administrative regulations that violate acts of the Legis-
lature are void. . . . They must conform to the legis-
lative will if we are to preserve an orderly system of gov-
ernment.12 (Emphasis added.) 
7. 276 Cal. App.2d 961,81 Cal. Rptr. 
318 (1969) (3rd Dist., Oct. 16, 1969). 
8. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 12150, 
12650, 13100, 13701. 
9. Daley v. State Department of So-
cial Welfare, 276 Cal. App.2d 961, 962, 
81 Cal. Rptr. 318, 319 (1969). 
10. In commenting on the loss of $4 
to a welfare recipient, a three-judge 
federal court recently noted: 
"While this may seem minor to most 
citizens, it is of crucial importance to 
the recipients here. . . . To an in-
CAL. L.AW 1970 
digent person now recelvmg approxi-
mately 90 cents per day for food, an 
additional 15 cents per day can hardly 
be described as de minimus. Access to 
such bare necessities of life . . . in-
volves a critical interest for those whose 
life depends on it." Rothstein v. Wy-
man, 303 F.Supp. 339, 348 (S.D.N.Y., 
1969). 
11. 67 Cal.2d 733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689, 
433 P.2d 697 (1967). 
12. 67 Cal.2d 733, 737, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
689, 692, 433 P.2d 697, 71)0. 
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A writ of mandate was issued directing the State Welfare 
Department to take all necessary steps to nullify and supersede 
its action in 1968, regarding the annual adjustment of grants 
of public assistance to reflect the change in the cost of living 
and in lieu thereof, to put into effect, as of December 1, 1968, 
an adjustment increasing recipients' grants by the proper 
amount of the cost-of-living increase.1s 
The final case where recipients challenged a state statute 
as violative of both federal law and the Constitution was 
Lewis v. M artin.14 There, AFDC recipients challenged a 
California statute15 that obligates an adult male assuming 
the role of spouse (known as a "MARS man") or a stepfather 
to support the needy children with whom he resides,16 and 
requires that his income be considered in determining the 
children's welfare grant whether or not he actually contributes 
to their support. The statute, in conjunction with implement-
ing state regulations,17 operates to conclusively presume that 
the man's income (less certain deductions) is available for 
such support. As a result, many needy children are denied 
welfare aid or have their grants significantly reduced without 
recelvmg any income. The statute's validity was upheld in 
Lewis by a three-judge federal court. This case is presently 
13. The specific relief granted by the 
Court is not reported in the decision, as 
the Court only stated that a writ should 
issue as prayed for by petitioners. 81 
Cal. Rptr. 318, 320. However, the 
terms of the relief set forth above re-
flect the prayer contained in the peti-
tion for the writ (pp. 11-12) filed in the 
action. 
14. Lewis v. Stark, No. 50284 Civil 
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 23, 1968) prob. juris. 
noted sub nom. Lewis v. Montgomery 
(U.S. Nov. 10, 1969) (38 U.S.L.W. 
3173). Now styled as Lewis v. Martin. 
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 9299, 
p. 10,543. 
15. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11351. 
Since the decision in Lewis, the statute 
has been amended to include a new sec-
tion 11351.5, but the same basic legal 
596 
problems still exist with regard to its 
validity. 
16. The extent of the legal obligation 
to support under the statute is open to 
question. See People v. Rozell, 212 
Cal. App.2d 875, 878, 28 Cal. Rptr. 478, 
480; People v. Owens, 231 Cal. App. 
2d 691, 697, 42 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157. 
See also 44 Ops. Atty. Gen. 155, 157 
where the Attorney General citing Peo-
ple v. Rozell concluded that a MARS 
is a man ". . . who has no legal 
obligation to support . . . and who 
may legally refuse to do so." The Civil 
Code expressly prohibits the imposition 
of legal liability on stepfathers gener-
ally. Civ. Code § 209. 
17. California Department of Social 
Welfare Regulations, Public Social Serv-
ices Manual § 44-133.5. 
CAL LAW 1970 38
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 20
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20
Welfare Law 
before the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal. The Court, al-
though finding a federal regulationI8 to be in direct conflict 
with the state statute, held the HEW regulation to be invalid 
as violative of the Social Security Act, despite the fact that the 
regulation reaffirmed policies regarding the assumption of ac-
tually available income approved by the Supreme Court in 
King v. Smith.I9 
The Court also rejected plaintiffs' constitutional challenges 
to the statute and regulations. The Court found no violation 
of due process, despite the fact that the statute operated to 
reduce state expenditures by irrefutably presuming receipt of 
nonexistent child support. The presumption proves unusually 
harsh, since the amount of assumed income is calculated by 
using welfare need standards; the very standards found to be 
inadequate in the Ivy case, above. In rejecting the due proc-
ess contention, it is submitted the Court improperly placed 
administrative convenience over the needs of impoverished 
children in direct contravention of the purposes of the AFDC 
program.20 Plaintiffs' equal protection challenges were also 
rejected, the Court employing the "any rational basis test" in 
reaching its decision. I For an excellent summary of the con-
stitutional challenges to Welfare and Institutions Code 
§ 11351, and the serious questions they raise, see the Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision of People v. Gilbert.2 
18. 45 C.F.R. 203.1. 
19. King v. Smith, n. 16, another 
three-judge court upheld the HEW reg-
ulation and its decision was affirmed 
per curiam by the Supreme Court. Sol-
man v. Shapiro, 300 F.Supp. 409, aff'd 
396 U.S. 5, 24 L.Ed.2d 5, 90 S.Ct. -
(1969). (After submission of this ar-
ticle, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the three-judge 
court. 38 U.S.L.W. 4307 (April, 1970).) 
(Given its holding, the United States 
Supreme Court did not reach the 
constitutional claims advanced by the 
welfare recipients.) 
20. Compare Damico v. California, 
discussed supra, where a different three-
CAL LAW 1970 
judge court in the same district took a 
seemingly contrary view. 
1. See text, supra, for a discussion of 
the proper equal protection test to be 
applied in reviewing welfare legislation. 
2. 1 Cal. Rptr. 475, 482-485, partic-
ularly n. 15 at 485, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724, 
729-731, n. 15 at 731, 462 P.2d 580, 
585-587, n. 15 at 587 (1969). 
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court did 
not have to resolve the constitutional 
challenges to § 11351, since the Court 
decided the case on other grounds. 
The Court overturned a welfare fraud 
conviction arising out of the failure of 
a recipient to report her cohabitation 
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C. Cases Affecting the Procedural Rights of Welfare 
Recipients-Fair Administration 
Over the years, those charged with the administration of 
public assistance programs have developed a complex of pro-
cedures by which the right to receive welfare is determined, 
modified, and terminated. Procedures were adopted to insure 
that recipients were advised of their rights under the public 
assistance programs,a and, further, that they were given a 
right to contest decisions of the welfare department regarding 
their status.4 However, without legal counsel and without 
knowledge of their rights, the vast majority of recipients were 
unable to avail themselves of these procedural protections and 
were subject to the unfettered discretion of their social work-
ers.5 Although many individual social workers were con-
cerned about their clients' well-being, the need to protect in-
dividual rights was subsidiary to the overriding pressure to 
conserve funds. 6 Not many administrative decisions were 
with an unrelated male on the ground 
that the special provision of Welf. & 
Inst. Code § 11482 (classifying as a 
misdemeanor any fraudulent represen-
tation in obtaining aid to dependent 
children) precludes prosecution of such 
fraud under the general theft statute, 
Penal Code § 484. In so holding, the 
Supreme Court expressly disapproved 
the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
People v. Lopez, 265 Cal. App.2d Supp. 
980, 71 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1968). 
3. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 10607-
10608, State Welfare Department Public 
Social Services Manual, Regulations 
40-107.1 and 40-109.1. 
4. The Social Security Act requires 
that an administrative appeal proce-
dure be established for all categorical 
aid programs. See, e.g., 42 V.S.C. 602 
(a)( 4). The administrative hearing 
available to recipients is known as the 
"fair hearing," where the local welfare 
department's determination may be re-
viewed by an impartial official of the 
598 
State Welfare Department. See HEW 
Federal Handbook of Public Assistance 
Administration, Part IV, §§ 6200 et seq. 
for the procedural elements embodied 
in the fair hearing; Welf. & Inst. Code 
§§ 10950 et seq. and State Welfare 
Regulations PSS 22-105-22-113. 
5. See Briar, Welfare from Below: 
Recipients' Views of the Public Wel-
fare System, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 370 
(1966); Graham, Civil Liberties Pro-
blems in Welfare Administration, 43 
N.Y.V. L. Rev. 836 (1968) . 
6. See Carlin, Howard and Mes-
'singer, Civil lustice and the Poor (Rus-
sell Sage Foundation, 1967). The Cal-
ifornia Assembly Office of Research 
and the Staff of the Assembly Commit-
tee on Social Welfare stated: ". . . 
It is clear that administrative 'account-
ability' is interpreted as a duty to avoid 
ineligibility rather than as a duty to 
make correct determinations. This 
produces a wasteful emphasis on over-
investigating eligibility and a tendency 
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challenged, since most recipients accepted the welfare work-
ers' word as final, and feared that "rocking the boat" might 
lead to an end to their welfare grants.7 
Although recipients have been entitled to request state ad-
ministrative hearings to review county action of which they 
are aggrieved, until recently no opportunity for notice or hear-
ing was given prior to the termination of welfare assistance. 
As a result, thousands of recipients were erroneously or pre-
maturely terminated from aid.s Many individuals, therefore, 
were abruptly deprived of money to purchase food and pay 
the rent; their only remedy being a state administrative hearing 
in which a decision is usually rendered many months after aid 
is terminated.9 
The question of the right to a hearing prior to the termina-
tion of welfare benefits has been the subject of much litigation 
in California and throughout the country. There has also 
been a considerable amount of scholarly research on the sub-
ject.10 Two California cases raising the issue are presently 
pending before the United States and California Supreme 
Courts. The facts in the first of these cases, Wheeler v. 
toward denying legitimate claims when 
any doubt exists." California Welfare: 
A Legislative Program for Reform, 
(Feb. 1969) at p. 92. 
7. The California experience has 
shown that social workers have great 
power over recipients, even to the point 
where recipients will abandon their con-
stitutional rights rather than risk a 
social worker's disfavor. Parrish v. 
Civil Service Commission of the Coun-
ty of Alameda, 66 Cal.2d 260, 268-270, 
57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628-630, 425 P.2d 
223, 228-230 (I967); see, also, County 
of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare 
Board, 229 Cal. App.2d 762, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 605 (1964). 
8. California Department of Social 
Welfare, Circular Letter No. 2064 
(Nov., 1967). 
9. Over 30 percent of the cases await-
CAL LAW 1970 
ing hearing decisions have been pend-
ing over 6 months; approximately half 
of the cases awaiting hearing decisions 
have been pending for over 3 months. 
SDSW, Division of Research & Statis-
tics, Draft Table 62, prepared for the 
1968-1969 Annual Statistical Report, 
as yet unpublished. 
10. See, e.g., Comment: Withdrawal 
of Public Welfare: The Right to a 
Prior Hearing, 76 Yale L.J. 1234 
(1967); Burris and Fessler, Constitu-
tional Due Process Hearing Require-
ments in the Administration of Public 
Assistance; The District of Columbia 
Experience, 16 American University L. 
Rev. 199 (1967); The Constitutional 
Minimum for the Termination of Wel-
fare Benefits: The Need for and Re-
quirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 Mich-
igan L. Rev. 112 (1969). 
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Montgomery,11 illustrate the dangers and inequities inherent 
in an inadequate hearing procedure. 
Plaintiff, Mae Wheeler, was an elderly widow receiving pub-
lic assistance under the OAS program. On August 30, 1967, 
the county welfare department received an anonymous tele-
phone call informing the county that Mrs. Wheeler had re-
ceived the proceeds of her deceased son's insurance policy 
and had transferred the money to her grandson. A welfare 
worker contacted Mrs. Wheeler that same day. Mrs. Wheeler 
explained that the money represented the proceeds of her son's 
veterans' insurance policy and that her deceased son had previ-
ously made a deathbed wish that Mrs. Wheeler give the check 
to her grandson in satisfaction of a debt owed by him to her 
grandson. Mrs. Wheeler's OAS grant was terminated by the 
county the next day because the county determined that she 
had transferred the funds in order to remain eligible for wel-
fare aid. In January, 1968 (some four months after aid was 
withdrawn) a state hearing officer found that the county had 
erred in terminating her benefits.12 
Mrs. Wheeler filed suit on November 30, 1967, to challenge 
termination of her benefits without prior notice or any oppor-
tunity for a hearing. Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli issued a tem-
porary restraining order restoring Mrs. Wheeler's grant. He 
found the action necessitated the convening of a three-judge 
court, and found a class action appropriate.13 
During the course of the litigation, the California State 
Welfare Department issued new regulations providing for an 
informal conference prior to termination with a 3-day notice 
requirement.14 The new procedure was challenged as being 
constitutionally inadequate, since it lacked many of the pro-
cedural protections usually associated with adjudicative hear-
ings.16 Specifically, it was contended that the notice period 
11. 296 F.Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 
1968); Prob. juris. noted, April 21, 
1969, 394 U.S. 970, 22 L.Ed.2d 751, 
89 S.Ct. 1452 (1969). Case argued on 
October 13, 1969. 
12. Wheeler v. Montgomery, Appel-
lants' Brief, pp. 4-6. 
600 
13. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F. 
Supp. 138 (1968). 
14. California State Department of 
Social Welfare, Public Social Services 
Manual, Regulation § 44-325.43. 
15. Welfare terminations often in-
volve factual determinations relating to 
CAL LAW 1970 42
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 20
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/20
Welfare Law 
was too short for adequate preparation, the conference was 
not held before an impartial referee (but could be held before 
the very person who made the initial decision to terminate), 
confrontation and cross-examination were not available, there 
was no requirement that a decision be based on the evidence, 
and the burden of proof was placed on the recipient to re-estab-
lish eligibility. Despite these contentions, the federal Court 
found the new California procedure to be constitutional, hold-
ing that the combination of the informal conference before 
termination plus the existence of the state administrative hear-
ing after termination, would provide sufficient procedural 
protection to recipients such as Mrs. Wheeler.16 In so ruling, 
the Court failed to recognize that state administrative hearing 
decisions were not rendered in a timely manner.17 The Court 
also failed to recognize that the existence of a subsequent state 
administrative hearing (even if rendered within 60 days, as 
required by federal law) is of little consolation to a recipient 
without a means of subsistence who is denied an opportunity 
to effectively contest an erroneous termination decision before 
aid is withheld.1s 
third-party evidence and testimony. 
This is especially true where AFDC 
families are discontinued because there 
is alleged to be a "man in the house." 
In administrative hearings held subse-
quent to termination (where cross-ex-
amination and the subpoena power are 
available), 54% of the cases resulted in 
reversing county discontinuances of aid 
and restoration of grants to California 
recipients. Briar, The Welfare Appeals 
System in California, October 23, 1968. 
(Mimeographed copy on file at the 
Graduate Social Welfare Library, Uni-
versity of California School of Social 
Welfare, Berkeley, California.) Dr. 
Briar read, analyzed, codified, and com-
pared statistically the 1,088 California 
hearing decisions rendered in 1965-66. 
16. 296 F.Supp. 138, 140. 
17. Although HEW required the 
states, effective July I, 1968, to render 
administrative hearing decisions with-
CAL LAW 1970 
in 60 days from the date of request, 
California failed to adhere to these re-
quirements. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 
Appellee's Brief, p. 17, n. 26. 
18. Not only does termination of aid 
without notice and hearing result in 
severe individual injury, but it discour-
ages later state administrative welfare: 
". . . the brutal m:ed of the recipient 
erroneously denied assistance will make 
him all the less able to pursue the sub-
sequent [fair] hearing now available. 
Faced with the need to live somehow, 
he can scarcely devote the time and 
energy necessary to effectively show his 
continued eligibility on appeal. Be-
cause of this, it is hardly surprising that 
recipients rarely ever request a hearing 
after the administrator stops payment." 
(Comment: Withdrawal of Public Wel-
fare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 
76 Yale L.J. 1234, 1244 (1967).) 
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Shortly after the federal Court's decision in Wheeler, a 
California state court reviewed the constitutionality of the 
regulation upheld in the Wheeler case and reached a contrary 
result. In McCullough v. Terzian,19 a Superior Court judge 
ordered the county welfare department to reinstate an AFDC 
family's grant and to continue aid until a decision was ren-
dered in a state administrative hearing. The Court found 
that the pretermination hearing must at least require that the 
decision be based solely on the evidence and be rendered by an 
impartial person or body not previously connected with the 
case. Because the Court felt these requirements were con-
stitutionally compelled, it declared the new California in-
formal conference procedure inadequate and invalid. The 
Court issued a writ of mandate to the State Welfare Depart-
ment establishing a procedure by which aid could continue 
to a recipient pending a decision in the state administrative 
hearing, if a request for such a hearing and an affidavit con-
troverting the reasons for discontinuance were filed with the 
welfare department.2o 
The McCullough decision was appealed, and on August 
19, 1969, the decision of the trial court was reversed. 1 The 
Court of Appeal held that the 3-day notice was not inadequate 
as a matter of law, nor was cross-examination, confrontation, 
or an impartial referee required in a pretermination hearing. 
The Court also found that the regulation satisfied the proce-
dural due process requirements of the California Constitution 
and the California Welfare and Institutions Code.! On De-
cember 19, 1969, however, the Supreme Court of California 
agreed to hear the McCullough case.3 Thus, the decision of 
19. No. 379011, Cal. Sup. Ct., Ala-
meda Cty. Judgment entered May 2, 
1968. 
20. No. 379011, Cal. Sup. Ct., Ala-
meda Cty. Judgment entered May 2, 
1968. 
1. McCu\lough v. Terzian, 275 Cal. 
App.2d 745, 80 Cal. Rptf. 283 (1969). 
2. 275 Cal. App.2d 745, 754, 80 Cal. 
Rptr 283, 289. 
3. No substantial dislocation of the 
602 
administrative agency has been expe-
rienced since the operation of the pro-
cedure established by the trial court in 
the McCu\lough case. For an eight-
month period, September 20, 1968 to 
April 20, 1969, only 55 recipients had 
aid continued pending their fair hearing. 
California Department, Research and 
Statistics Division, Restoration of Aid 
Payments Fo\lowing Filing of Affidavit, 
Table 8 (May 6, 1969). 
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the trial court remains in full force and effect, and aid can 
continue pending the state administrative hearing decision 
for recipients who contend their aid has been erroneously 
terminated. 
The Court of Appeal decision upholding the California 
regulation gave a very strict reading to the cases involving 
procedural due process, ruling in each instance that because 
no case precisely granted the protections sought by the recipi-
ents, no right to the procedures requested was indicated. 
More importantly, the Court failed to give any weight to 
the plight of individual recipients erroneously denied aid or to 
their dependent relationship vis-a-vis the welfare department. 
Thus, the Court failed to perform the basic task of balancing 
the competing interests of the individual and the state in 
deciding what due process requires in this particular adminis-
trative context. 4 
There is considerable reason to believe that the Court of 
Appeal decision, as well as the three-judge Court decision in 
Wheeler, will ultimately be reversed.6 Since these decisions, 
both the California6 and U.S. Supreme Courts7 have held pre-
judgment wage garnishment unconstitutional, recognizing that 
the withdrawal of one's livelihood (even temporarily) can 
result in severe injury to the individual.s Furthermore, since 
Wheeler, other federal and state courts faced with the issue 
have ruled, in the main, that a hearing containing basic ele-
4. For the generally accepted test to 
be applied in determining the extent to 
which procedural protections are to be 
afforded in a particular administrative 
context, see the concurring opinion of 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123, 163,95 L.Ed. 817, 849, 
71 S.Ct. 624, 644 (1951). 
5. As noted supra, after submission 
of this article, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the three-judge 
court in the Wheeler case. - U.S. 
-, 25 L.Ed.2d 307, 90 S.Ct. 1026, 38 
U.S.L.W. 4230; see also Goldberg v. 
CAL LAW 1970 
Kelly, - U.S. -, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 38 
U.s.L.W. 4223 (March, 1970). 
6. McCallop v. Universal Acceptance 
Corp., No. 605038 (Sup. Ct. S.F., July 
11, 1969). Aff'd, McCallop v. Car-
berry, No. S.F. 22705, 1 Cal.3d 903, 83 
Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 
of Calif., January 30, 1970). 
7. Sniadach v. Family Finance Cor-
poration of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 23 
L.Ed.2d 349, 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969). 
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 9879, p. 
10,975. 
8. 395 U.S. 337,340-342, 23 L.Ed.2d 
349, 353-354, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 1822-23. 
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ments of due process is required before welfare aid can be 
terminated.9 Indeed, two federal judges in the same district 
where Wheeler was decided ruled that such hearings were 
required before aid to General Assistance recipients could be 
terminated or denied.10 In addition, HEW, possibly as a result 
of the court litigation and in recognition of the need for greater 
procedural fairness in welfare administration, has issued a new 
regulation to become effective June 1, 1970, that requires the 
continuation of aid in contested welfare terminations pending 
a state administrative hearing decision.l1 
Given the significant interests of the recipients at stake when 
aid is terminated, it is suggested that the administrative pro-
cedural protections afforded to others in our society should 
also be granted welfare recipients. As Professor Charles 
Reich has stated: 
"In a society where a significant portion of population 
is dependent on social welfare, decisions about eligibility 
for benefits are among the most important that a govern-
ment can make. By one set of values the granting of a 
license to broadcast over a television channel, or to 
build a hydroelectric project on a river, might seem of 
more far-reaching significance. But in a society that con-
siders the individual as its basic unit, a decision affecting 
the life of a person or a family should not be taken by 
means that would be unfair for a television station or a 
power company. Indeed, full adjudicatory procedures 
are far more appropriate in welfare cases than in most of 
the areas of administrative procedure."12 
9. See, e.g., Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. 
Supp. 893 (S.D., New York, 1968), sub 
nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, prob. juris. 
noted April 21, 1969 (37 U.S.L.W. 
3399). Argument held Oct. '13, 1969; 
Machado v. Hackney, 299 F.Supp. 644 
(W.D. Tex. 1969); Moore v. Houston, 
No. 104435 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne 
Cty., Nov. 1, 1968); CCH Poverty Law 
Reporter § 10,717, p. 11,579. 
10. Robertson v. Born, No. 51364 
Civil (N .D. Cal., a preliminary injunc-
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tion issued June 12, 1969), ordering 
a full hearing prior to termination of 
county welfare benefits. Peckham, J .); 
CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 10254, p. 
11,201. Brunner v. Terzian, No. 51813 
Civil (N.D. Cal.) (TRO granting similar 
relief issued on July 25, 1969. Swei-
gert, J.); CCH Poverty Law Reporter § 
10,248, p. 11,198. 
11. 34 Fed. Reg. 13595, January 23, 
1969. 
12. Reich, Individual Rights and So-
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Although some existing California statutes provide recipi-
ents with the promise of equitable treatment and assistance 
from the county departments in the determination of their 
eligibility and grant levels,13 often the statutory commands are 
not followed in practice. For example, Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 10500, requires that: 
"Every person administering aid under any public as-
sistance program perform his duties in such 
manner as to secure for every [applicant] the maximum 
amount of aid to which he is entitled . " 
Despite this statutory command and the detailed regula-
tions implementing that statutory mandate, some counties 
in California have engaged in the practice of not informing 
individuals of their right to apply for particular public as-
sistance programs or of their right to request a hearing if they 
are aggrieved by county action. The Sutter County Welfare 
Department was the most infamous violator of the statutory 
mandate. To stop these practices, welfare recipients sought a 
writ of mandate to compel the Sutter County Welfare Director 
to advise all applicants of their right to apply for assistance 
and of their right to a state administrative hearing. The peti-
tion was dismissed by the trial court, but the decision was 
reversed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Diaz v. Qui-
toriano. 14 The reviewing Court held that no administrative 
remedies need be exhausted to bring such a petition, since the 
action was on behalf of a class of recipients and the state 
administrative hearing process did not allow for class re-
lief. The Court of Appeal set forth much of the statutory 
and regulatory material referred to above,16 and concluded 
that the county welfare departments had a duty to inform 
recipients of their rights under the public assistance programs, 
including their right to appeal. On remand of the case to the 
cial Welfare: The Emerging Legal Is- 14. Diaz v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal. 
sues. 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1253 (1965). App.2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969). 
13. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 10500, 15. 268 Cal. App.2d 807, 810 n. 6, 
11000. 74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361, n. 6. 
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trial court, a stipulated judgment was entered. IS It was stipu-
lated that petitioners' allegations regarding Sutter County's 
action were true. Among the more significant portions of the 
stipulated order, Sutter County agreed to: 
"( 1 0) . exercise their duty to courteously and 
promptly grant every applicant the maximum amount of 
aid to which he is entitled. 
( 11) All inquirers shall be immediately advised of their 
right to make written application for any type of [wel-
fare] . . . aid. 
( 13) Respondents shall advise all applicants of their 
right to request a fair hearing "17 
The Diaz case is significant not only for the procedural 
rights secured for the recipients of Sutter County and the 
recognition that recipients may go directly to the courts for 
vindication of their rights, but also is important for its ex-
posure of the type of arbitrary and illegal practices that exist 
in the administration of public assistance in this state. Al-
though most counties do not act so blatantly as did Sutter 
County, nevertheless, many procedural rights secured by state 
and federal law are honored more in their violation than in 
their obedience. 18 
IV. Conclusion 
The year 1969 has seen substantial legal challenges to 
many of the practices and policies underpinning the present 
welfare system. Many issues (indeed, many illegal practices) 
are still to be brought before the courts. It is not surprising 
16. Diaz v. Quitoriano, No. 14651 
Sup. Ct. Sutter Cty. (July 7, 1969). 
17. Diaz v. Quitoriano, No. 14651 
Sup. Ct. Sutter Cty. (July 7, 1969). 
18. As noted previously, California is 
presently violating federal time require-
ments in the rendering of fair hearing 
decisions. Until recently, California 
failed to comply with state and federal 
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law in compiling a summary of fair 
hearing decisions that would be avail-
able to the public. At present, although 
Aid to the Totally Disabled eligibility 
determinations are to be made within 
60 days, San Francisco County has had 
over 1,000 cases pending for more than 
six months. These are but a few of the 
numerous examples of state and county 
violations of existing law. 
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that in many cases clear violations of law were found to exist. 
For years, no legal representation was available to the poor, 
no counter-pressures were operative to insure that individual 
rights were not sacrificed for the sake of economy and ease of 
administration. For years, no attorneys or organized groups 
of recipients were available to hold the administrators of one 
of the state's largest bureaucracies accountable for their ac-
tions. 
Perhaps the best summary of the legal developments in the 
welfare field in California was given by the former State Wel-
fare Director in his final press statement: 
Almost simultaneously, it seemed, with my appoint-
ment as Director by Governor Reagan there began a 
series of court actions both state and national to chal-
lenge public welfare rules and regulations. 
Here in California we have been challenged on dozens 
of issues, all of them coming back to the fact that for the 
first time, the poor have real and effective advocacy in 
our courts. This, again, is the significant point trans-
cending all other considerations and consequences. An 
era of advocacy has begun out of which, I am sure, public 
assistance is never going to be the same. 
Not only is this happening through the courts, but also 
in the meetings and hearings of welfare boards, advisory 
commissions and administrators at every government 
level. The poor have come out of their apathy, and our 
accountability for what we do and why we do it is theirs 
to know-as it always has been under the law but never 
before so vocally sought.19 
Notwithstanding recent decisions, whether the courts can 
serve as an effective means to redress the grievances of the poor 
dependent upon public assistance is still an open question. 
19. Calif. Welfare Director's News-
letter, Special Issue (Vol. V, No.6) p. 
3-4 (Nov.-Dec. 1969). 
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So, too, is the more fundamental question of whether our 
society is ready and willing to support the poor adequately 
and with dignity. Only one thing is certain-the era of ad-
vocacy by, and on behalf of, the poor will definitely continue. 
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